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Preface 
This thesis focuses on performance management systems (PMSs) in the Swedish banking 
industry. More specifically, it presents a longitudinal study of how and why the PMSs of 
Swedish banks have changed over the deregulations’ first quarter of a century i.e. from 1985 
until 2010. The study is based on the findings of previous literature and interviews with top 
managers in Swedish banks. Since the Swedish banking industry primarily consists of 
commercial banks and savings banks the study has been divided into two essays. Essay 1 deal 
with the savings banks, whereas Essay 2 deals with the large commercial banks. A summary 
of the main results of the two essays is given at the end of the chapter. 
The aim of this introductory chapter is to give the reader a glance at my research process, 
which naturally has not been as linear as it may appear from the text outlined below. The 
importance of history has been formative to my understanding and has led me to indulge in a 
broad reading of literature that deals with times and events that are outside the timeframe of 
the study. It is in this vein that the present chapter starts with an introduction that takes us 
back to the early 20
th
 century and the time when the foundation of the modern banking in 
Sweden was laid. My broad interest in history has made it a constant struggle to focus on the 
banks’ PMSs and leave other matters of interest aside. That brings me directly to a second 
important clarification. The present thesis does not deal with PMSs, nor does it deal with 
banks; but it deals with PMSs in banks. As noted by many distinguished authors, the banking 
industry is indeed different from other industries, not only in terms of its importance to 
society, but also because of operational specificities that could make certain parts of the 
PMSs, that are relevant to firms in other industries, of less value to banks. Still, the financial 
crisis and the consistent claims of miss-management directed at the banking industry have 
been important motivators for me and do also serve as relevant arguments for the importance 
of this topic today. 
After the introduction I will briefly describe three streams of literature that have been 
central to my research process. All three fields have different theoretical and methodological 
underpinnings but there are also commonalities, which have been important in order to link 
them together and to utilize each field in the process. My main theoretical contribution lies 
within the third framework, management accounting change, where I test two different 
models that have been suggested to gain a better understanding of why organizations change 
their PMSs. 
In the third part of the chapter I discuss some of the methodological issues that concern 
the study and proceed with a detailed description of my research method. The method is 
discussed here for two reasons. Firstly, the aim of the essays is publication (Essay 1 has been 
accepted in a research anthology with chapters on European banking and finance, and Essay 2 
aims to be submitted to the Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change) and since the 
main contributions of the papers lies in the empirical part, the method sections are relatively 
short in the essays. Secondly, both essays rely on similar methods and therefore one 
description is believed to be sufficient. 
The final part of the chapter summarizes the essays and gives some suggestions on how I 
will proceed with my research process during the coming years. Another important part of a 
research process is of course all the people that are involved in this creative process and 
before proceeding with the chapter I would like to thank some of the main actors. 
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Introduction 
In the 1920s and 1930s the world’s financial markets went through turbulent times 
including infamous events like the ‘Black Thursday’ during the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and 
the Krueger Crash in 1932. Thereafter, the European banking markets were kept highly 
national and protected. For about three decades friendly relations dominated between 
European and US banks and almost no competition existed among the two. However, at the 
early 1960s, large US companies started entering the European market and, as a consequence 
of massive US foreign direct investment in Europe, US banks followed. The US banks 
competed aggressively and reached a dominant position in the Eurocurrency (mostly 
Eurodollar) market. During the 1960s European banks responded defensively, but they soon 
came to realize that they needed to adapt to this new climate and in the 1970s the defensive 
strategies were changed into more successful growth strategies and a faster adoption of new 
technological developments. The new market conditions created a pressure on the 
Governments to reduce the bank regulations and the market-oriented liberalization 
movements, driven by Reagan in the US, and Thatcher in the UK, initiated a deregulatory 
wave that would spread across the western world and change the financial service industry 
into its current form (Battilossi & Cassis, 2002; Larson et al., 2011). When banks left the 
sheltered environment of the postwar period for a competitive and ‘unregulated’ market, the 
need arose for new and more sophisticated information and control systems (Channon, 1986). 
The Swedish financial markets were deregulated during the mid-1980s. Since then, 
Swedish banks have had to adapt to tougher competition, increasing demands for profitability 
and efficiency, rapid technological change, globalization of the financial markets, and an 
international reregulation of the banking industry (see the Appendix A for a list of relevant 
publications). In no way has this adaption been a smooth process, and the Swedish financial 
crisis at the early 1990s clearly illustrated the close relationship between profitability and risk 
in banking (Lindblom, 2001). Still the research on management accounting and control in 
banks has remained limited and according to Soin & Schyett (2009:1392): ‘it is surprising 
that management accounting scholars show so little engagement in the analysis of 
management accounting practices in financial services, given the importance of this sector to 
the global economy’. To address this gap the overall purpose1 of my thesis is to increase our 
understanding of what type of performance management systems
2
 (PMSs) banks have 
adopted, how these PMSs have changed, and why they have changed during the 
deregulations’ first quarter of a century. The following two sections describe how I have gone 
about to fulfill my purpose and what remains to be done. 
Framework 
Three streams of literature have been of particular importance to this thesis; (i) the 
strategy, structure, ownership, and performance literature, (ii) the performance management 
systems framework, and (iii) the literature on management accounting change. The first two 
streams have primarily been used to inform the method of the thesis, whereas the third one 
provides a theoretical framework to understand PMS’s change.  
The strategy, structure, ownership, and performance literature 
As discussed above the 1980s marked a turning point in the history of the banking 
industry, one that is highly interlinked with PMS’s change. In order to study a period of 25 
                                                 
1
 The formulation of this purpose has gained considerably from a research project initiated at the Gothenburg 
Research Institute (GRI) in 2008. For more information please visit; http://gri.gu.se/forskning/bank-
management. 
2
 See the section on performance management systems below. 
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years it was believed that the thesis would gain from a historic approach. The interaction 
between business historians and management theorists is not a new phenomenon but 
according to O’Sullivan & Graham (2010:775-776) a ‘…more direct and explicit engagement 
between their fields’ would benefit our understanding of business and the management of 
enterprise. One of the most influential spokespersons for this interaction was Alfred D. 
Chandler Jr (Whittington, 2008). Chandler (1984) emphasizes two challenges facing the 
historian: (i) to relate human events and actions to the broader economic, social, political and 
cultural environment, and (ii) to develop generalizations and concepts that, even though they 
are derived from a specific time and place, could be applicable to other times and places, and 
used as analytical tools by researchers active in other fields. To make such generalizations 
data are needed and in business history such data will consist of ‘detailed descriptions…of 
businessmen and businesswomen and the enterprises they managed’ (Chandler, 1984:3). 
These descriptions must be related to the context of that time and only if such account is taken 
can we proceed to generalization.  
Chandler has had a significant impact on management accounting field but as Luft (2007) 
points out his perspective is far from the only one that gives explanations to the rise of 
modern management accounting. Luft sorts the prevailing explanations into three main 
theoretical perspectives (see page 272); (i) explanations based on Marxist theories of class 
conflict between labor and capital, (ii) postmodern explanations related to a shift from 
physically coercive power over others, to disciplinary power based on measures of individual 
performance, and (iii) efficiency-based explanations. The works of Chandler (1962; 1977; 
1990) are efficiency-based explaining the rise of more sophisticated management accounting 
techniques with increasing market size and the invention of high-volume production 
technology that required better ways to handle intraorganizational planning and control. 
Growth and technology are also commonly used variables in explaining the adoption of more 
sophisticated management accounting techniques in the banking industry after the 
deregulations (see e.g. Helliar et al., 2002), and the ideas of Chandler was therefore believed 
to benefit the study. 
In the wake of Chandler, an ambitious research project with the aim of mapping large 
firms’ responses to economic change across Europe from 1957-2007 was launched (Wilson et 
al., 2007). Although building largely on the ideas of Chandler, Whittington & Mayers (2000) 
and others
3
 have furthered the framework, and they refer to it under the frame of strategy, 
structure, ownership, and performance (SSOP). According to Larson et al (2011) SSOP 
studies are rare within the banking industry (the seminal works by Channon (1977; 1986) 
marks a notable exception) and, therefore, they evaluate the ideas discussed by Whittington & 
Mayer (2000) and Rondi et al., (2004) within the European financial service sector through a 
case study of three large European banks (Barclays, ABN AMRO, and UBS). They show that 
all three banks have pursued similar strategies of becoming global and universal banks, i.e. 
mergers and acquisitions combined with organic growth. They further illustrate how all three 
banks have stuck to growth strategies, even when profits plunged and despite clear evidence 
pointing to more prosperous strategies such as examinations of productivity and providing 
services in line with core competencies. In addition, all three banks experimented with their 
organizational structure by applying some type of trial and error process. In other words, they 
adopted the structure to new internal and external conditions rather than changing the 
structure to fit the strategy. The authors conclude that the financial service sector differs 
significantly from the manufacturing sector, but unfortunately they do not elaborate on how 
these differences may inflict upon the existing SSOP framework. Moreover, they do not 
discuss what type of information and control systems the banks utilize. 
                                                 
3 See for example (these references are from Wilson et al., 2007:227): Whitley (1998); Whittington & Mayers 
(2000); Rugman & Verbeke, (2004); Schröter (2007) 
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At this point it was clear that although the SSOP approach gives highly relevant advice in 
terms of how to collect and structure data from historical sources, as well as rich discussions 
on the methodology of historical research (elaborated on below), it offers limited help in 
explaining how and why the PMSs change, within the banking industry. Accordingly, the next 
step was to proceed into the closely related ‘relevance lost’ debate in general and the 
performance management systems literature in particular. 
The performance management systems framework 
The ‘relevance lost’ debate started by strong criticism from Johnson & Kaplan (1987) 
that emphasized the lack of innovation in management accounting. They asserted that 
traditional ‘management accounting systems are inadequate for today’s environment’ 
(1987:xi). In the traces of these claims researchers described a failure in linking performance 
measurements to strategic initiatives and to account for advances in technology (Hussain, 
2005). The criticism was mainly directed at the manufacturing sector but was equally 
important to the service sector, including banks (Soin & Scheytt, 2009). The debate has 
continued within the management accounting area but has expanded to include the practical 
relevance of the contemporary research on management accounting and control
4
 and scholars 
have started to argue for a broader perspective on these issues (Malmi & Brown, 2008).  
One of the early propagators of a broader and more practice-oriented view is Otley and in 
1999 he published a paper that summarized the ideas into five questions under the frame of 
performance management. The main strengths of this framework is, according to Stringer 
(2007:94), the inclusion of a wide range of performance issues and the recognition that it is 
the combinations of these performance elements that matters. Still critics argue that the 
framework is overly rational and prescriptive, and that it fails to address the interconnections 
between different parts of the performance management system (see Stringer, 2007 and 
Ferreira & Otley, 2009 for extended discussions). To account for these problems Otley 
together with Ferreira started working on an update, which got circulated as a working paper 
for several years until it was finally published in 2009. The updated version consists of 12 
questions (see Figure 1) and according to Ferreira & Otley (2009:266) the intention of their 
framework is to: ‘provide a descriptive tool that may be used to amass evidence upon which 
further analysis can be based’. 
Figure 1 clearly shows the broad nature of the PMSs framework and Ferriera & Otley 
(2009:264) admit to the difficulties in establishing a single definition of the PMSs concept but 
they view PMSs ‘as the evolving formal and informal mechanisms, processes, systems, and 
networks used by organizations for conveying the key objectives and goals elicited by 
management, for assisting the strategic process and ongoing management through analysis, 
planning, measurement, control, rewarding, and broadly managing performance, and for 
supporting and facilitating organizational learning and change’. Based on a similar definition 
Adler (2011:254-255) summarizes the typical organizational practices involved with 
performance management under four main control mechanisms; operating systems and 
procedures, organizational structure, organizational culture, and training and development. 
Accordingly, both Ferreira & Otley (2009) and Alder (2011) encompass all the tools used by 
managers to implement the main objectives of the organization. This definition includes both 
tools used to control employees (management control systems) and information used for 
decision support (management accounting systems), and it is also the definition that has 
guided this study. 
                                                 
4
 See e.g. Lukka & Granlund, 2002; Berry et al., 2009; Helden & Northcott, 2010 for extended discussions. 
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Figure 1. The Performance Management Systems Framework 
Source: Ferreira & Otley, 2009:268 
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The broad and practice-oriented focus of the PMSs framework was considered 
appropriate for the purpose of this study for at least two reasons. The first reason is the 
implicit interconnectedness between the SSOP approach and the performance management 
framework. Ferreira & Otley (2009) are greatly influenced by the broader control related 
issues, discussed in e.g. Johnson et al. (2005), which is of major importance also in the SSOP 
approach. In addition, performance is a key concept in both frameworks. The SSOP approach 
tries to illuminate how strategy, structure and ownership have affected performance over time, 
whereas the PMSs framework deals with the systems intended to support performance at a 
specific point in time. Finally, both frameworks are descriptive and can be used to describe 
matters, at an organizational level of analysis. The second reason is more practical and deals 
with the field-based research methodology of the thesis. Since one of the main data sources of 
the thesis involves in-depth interviews, with top managers from the Swedish banking 
industry, a broad framework that relies on a practitioner-oriented typology was believed to 
facilitate the communication with respondents. 
The PMSs framework is highly useful to amass evidence on what type of PMSs the 
Swedish banks have adopted but it still lacks the explanatory power needed to fulfill the 
purpose of the thesis. To move beyond the descriptive nature of the PMS framework, a third 
framework was needed, one that could help to explain how and why the PMSs of Swedish 
banks had been adapted to the altering external pressures. In search of such a framework it 
was not farfetched to proceed into the literature on management accounting change. 
The management accounting change literature 
In the early 1980s Hopwood and others started propagating for a more process oriented 
view on accounting change, which gradually developed into a stream of literature, viewing 
accounting as a situated and context-dependent practice. These studies commonly draw on 
historical data to explain current practices within organizations (Luft, 2007). Among the most 
influential researchers within this field is Robert Scapens. In the year 2000, he and John 
Burns, published a framework, which emphasizes the role of accounting in the change 
process. Building on Giddens structuration theory and old institutional economics, Burns & 
Scapens (2000:5) propose that ‘management accounting practices can both shape and be 
shaped by the institutions which govern organizational activity’. A large number of studies, 
within this stream, have used their framework to gain a deeper understanding of management 
accounting change through longitudinal case-studies (see Soin et al., 2002; Guerreiro et al., 
2006; Van der Steen, 2011 for banking cases). These studies emphasize the importance of 
closely studying the object in order to map which techniques organizations have actually 
implemented.  
However, the Burns & Scapens (2000) framework has been less successful in explaining 
how firms respond to external pressures (Munir et al., 2011; Arroyo, 2012) and there have 
been several recent calls for research that ‘…advance our understanding of the interaction 
between the wider social, environmental and political pressures for change and 
organizational behaviors – including the choices that organizations make in response to these 
pressures…’ (Moll et al., 2006:198; see also Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Modell, 2007). 
In response to such calls both Munir et al (2011) and Arroyo (2012) have suggested 
theoretical models of change that bridge the framework with New Institutional Sociology. 
New institutional sociology stems from the study of organizations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and is further discussed in Essay 1, which relies on the Munir et al 
(2011) model. The authors develop a comprehensive model aimed at studying PMS’s change, 
within the specific context of banks, and the model provides a useful framework for the 
purpose of this thesis. Similarly, the Arroyo (2012) model, applied in Essay 2, is based on the 
institutional entrepreneurship literature, which is commonly used by organizational scholars 
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to address the paradox of embedded agency i.e. how actors may change institutions despite 
pressures of stasis (Battilana et al., 2009). The model does not specifically address banks but 
is highly relevant for the purpose of this thesis. The strong external pressures facing banks 
from regulators, media, and the public (Deephouse, 1996; Munir et al., 2011) requires a model 
that allows for the inclusion of such pressures but which can also be utilized to explain the 
tremendous change that the banking industry has gone through over the past decades (Wilson 
et al., 2010) and how it has affected the PMSs. 
Contributions 
The main theoretical contribution of this thesis is to explore two prominent change 
models that have been suggested to bridge the seminal work by Burns & Scapens (2000) with 
New Institutional Sociology. In doing so, the thesis contributes to the ongoing debate in 
management accounting change about how to combine exogenous and endogenous factors of 
change. The findings show that research on management accounting change may gain 
considerably from the use of these models but that further work is needed to establish the 
relations more clearly. The thesis further contributes to the discussion on the practical 
relevance of management accounting and control research by integrating the PMSs 
framework into the two models of change. It is shown that this integration facilitates the 
communication with practitioners by allowing the researcher to ask relevant questions 
regardless of the seniority of the respondents. Finally, the timeframe goes beyond the 
commonly used timeframe in studies of management accounting change and, as discussed 
further below, this has implications for the collection and interpretation of data. The thesis 
identifies the importance of time to our perception of change and suggests that further 
exchange with historical research may advance the study of management accounting change. 
The next section discusses the methodological considerations of which the thesis is concerned 
and outlines the methods used to collect and analyze the data. 
Methodology 
Similar to what is argued by Whittington & Mayer (2000) this thesis is bounded in terms 
of generalizability primarily in three ways; time, space, and depth. First, the circumstances of 
the study are bounded in time to the deregulations’ first quarter of a century. This means that 
although the years leading up to the deregulation is likely to have had an inherent effect on the 
outset of the study, and despite being accounted for to some extent by brief descriptions, it is not 
the intention to proceed with inferences outside this time-frame. In addition, the amount and type 
of data that was available throughout the period of investigation differs to some extent. As noted 
by Ryan et al (2002) internal validity in case study research is often discussed in terms of 
contextual validity i.e. the credibility of the evidence and conclusions of the research. The 
authors explain that triangulation is commonly used to improve the contextual validity of the 
study and they identify a number of ways to use triangulation such as data triangulation, 
method triangulation, researcher triangulation, theory triangulation and methodological 
triangulation. One of the major validity concerns of this study refers to memory bias. 
Respondents were asked to reflect on issues that happened more than two decades ago and 
several aspects can distort the memory and make people remember certain things and block 
out other (see Schacter, 1999 for an extended discussion). For that reason complementary data 
including annual reports, statistical data, historical descriptions, and internal documents, have 
been used to corroborate the interview findings and improve the contextual validity through data 
triangulation. 
Second, the circumstances of space are less strictly defined. While generalizations external to 
the banking industry is outside the scope of the study, a field is under constant evolution and the 
11 
 
actual definition of the Swedish banking industry is open to debate5. The thesis focuses on 
Swedish banks and gives the other actors, which may be associated with the Swedish banking 
industry, a more peripheral role. Moreover, the geographical scope could possible reach beyond 
the national borders of Sweden, not least in respect to the increasingly internationalization among 
Swedish banks in recent years. The Scandinavian countries, in which several of the Swedish 
banks have become major players, are included in the bounded space of this study. To that 
account the study may provide insights for researchers and practitioners outside the fuzzy 
boarders of space; perhaps not in terms of generalizable knowledge but rather as tentative 
suggestions in respect to an ongoing compilation of knowledge of the complex relationships of 
performance management in the banking industry. 
Finally, as depicted so delicately by Whittington & Mayer (2000) the nature of this type of 
generalization is two-dimensional illustrating the limitation in terms of depth of the study. Recent 
studies on management accounting change have primarily adopted a process perspective on 
change, arguing for longitudinal case studies as the proper way to study procedural changes 
(Burns & Scapens, 2000; Moll et al., 2006; Modell, 2007; Johansson & Siverbo, 2009). Although 
this study will adhere to the longitudinal perspective it is impossible to account for the deep 
complexity of everyday practice provided for in these studies and as such the study will remain 
‘thin’, containing generalizations that can tell us something about what to do in general but little 
about the particular case (Whittington & Mayer, 2000:45). Still by studying a field, rather than a 
single organization, the thesis opens up to a ‘wider perspective’ on PMS’s change (Johansson & 
Siverbo, 2009:159) that allows for comparisons between organizations, that experience similar 
external pressures. 
Data sources and methods 
The study builds on three main data sources; annual reports, previous literature, and 
interviews. In addition, a number of reports and other internal documents have been received 
from respondents. The internal documents are not categorized in a systematic way but are 
studied in combination with other data sources to corroborate and extend the empirical part. 
For example, documents prepared by a consultant while working with the change process in 
Gota bank (see Essay 2) are used in the analysis together with the interview. The documents 
contain material that support much of what was said in the interview, thereby improving the 
contextual validity
6
. At the same time, the documents do not contain a complete description of 
the project but only bits and pieces and is therefore considered a complement to the interview, 
rather than the other way around. 
My data collection process started by a collection of annual reports of the four largest 
banks from 1985-2010, and a booklet called “The Banks” (Bankerna) published on a yearly 
basis by Statistics Sweden until 2003 (here 1980 was used as the starting year). The more 
recent annual reports were downloaded from the banks’ webpages, whereas the earlier 
versions were found in the library or received directly from the banks. In the initial stage the 
focus was put on a few key performance indicators and major events that had affected 
individual banks. However, the collection was gradually broadened to include most of the 
balance sheet data, parts of the income statement, and data about CEO and Chairman of the 
board. The data was transferred into two excel-sheets manually. The first excel-sheet contains 
the main events concerning each of the four banks for every year from 1985-2010, whereas 
the second excel-sheet contains the accounting numbers and key performance indicators of 
these banks over the same period. This process allowed me to familiarize myself with the 
banks, their financial performance, and the major external events as expressed in the annual 
                                                 
5
 See for example Hoffman (1999) and Dorado (2005) for discussions on what constitutes a field. 
6
 It should be noted that the respondent may have studied the documents before the interview possibly affecting 
his view of what actually happened. 
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reports. It also allowed me to create a basic chronology over the entire time-period. Following 
Larson et al (2011) tables was generated based on the accounting data to get a first impression 
of, for example when and/or if any of the banks had shifted their strategic focus. Deviations 
from the trend were used as a reason to go back to the annual report and look for explanations. 
As an example, the cost/income-ratio of SEB changed drastically from an average level of 
0.54 between 1985 and 1996 to an average level of 0.67 between 1997 and 2010. This change 
coincided with a greater focus, in the bank, on income generated outside the net interest 
income and thus indicated a strategic shift towards diversification (see Essay 2). 
The previous literature can be divided into three main categories. The first category 
includes: research papers, dissertations, books, biographies, reports, and other material related 
to the Swedish banking industry (see Appendix A). The second category includes all bank-
related management accounting studies I could find (about 20 papers and 5 working papers in 
total), in which Soin & Schyett (2009) offered a good starting-point. The third and final 
category refers to more general studies on (primarily European) banking. This last category 
includes an extensive number of publications, hence a selective reading was done based on 
Goddard et al., (2007), Wilson et al., (2010), and The Oxford Handbook of Banking. 
The interviews followed a semi-structured interview guide (see Appendix B). Before 
each interview I prepared by reading the bank’s annual reports for the entire period, going 
through the bank’s webpage, and reading up on other material that was available about the 
bank and/or the respondent such as biographies and other material published by the 
respondent. One consequence of this preparation was that my own perception of the 
respondent and the bank was affected. Moreover, since the questions during the interview 
were informed by the preparation the questions were asked in different order and with 
different focus in the interviews. Although the preparation may have affected my own 
understanding it was an important step to ensure that the questions were informed and 
relevant, and to extract as much information as possible from each interview and as noted by 
De Loo & Lowe (2012:4) ‘[A]a thorough understanding of the events or phenomena that the 
researcher has studied may be all we can strive for’. Furthermore, before entering the 
doctoral program my experience of the banking industry was limited. Throughout the research 
process I constantly increased my understanding of the industry both through interviews and 
the reading of additional literature. Thus, even though the theme-questions of the interview 
guide remained the same, the follow-up questions did gradually become more specific and 
informed. Thereby the follow-up questions were possibly biased by my “current” 
understanding at the time of the interview. To alleviate this problem the transcripts and 
analysis has been cross-checked with some of the respondents. 
All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. The data analysis is similar to what 
Quinlan (2011:425) describes as ‘the simple approach to qualitative data analysis’. After 
careful readings of the transcripts, lists of themes that occurred in the text were prepared. The 
themes were compared to the other data in which further themes were created. When no 
additional themes emerged a process of collapsing the themes started. This process was 
guided by the previously created chronology i.e. the major events that had occurred during the 
period of investigation and the PMSs framework. Color coding and mind maps were used to 
proceed the abstraction. Similar to what is recommended by Scapens
7
 the data analysis started 
directly after the first interview, resulting in several revisions of the initial analysis. It was 
only towards the end of the data collection that further reading of the transcripts did not result 
in major changes to the text. 
                                                 
7 Lecture notes received at a Ph.D. course in qualitative research in 2011. 
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The Essays 
Essay 1 
The first paper, ‘Performance Management Systems in Swedish Savings Banks – A 
longitudinal study through the deregulations’ first quarter of a century ‘, particularly focuses 
on how and why Swedish savings banks have adapted their performance management systems 
to altering external pressures over the deregulations’ first quarter of a century. Using 
interview data from four Swedish savings banks and the Swedish Savings Banks Association, 
this study explores a framework developed by Munir et al (2011) specifically aimed at 
analyzing organizational responses to external pressures and PMS’s change in banks. The 
study shows that Swedish savings banks have developed a wide range of PMSs practices over 
the period studied. Some of these have been developed in response to external pressures but 
agency seems to be an important aspect in Swedish savings banks. 
Essay 2 
The second paper, ’Institutional entrepreneurship and change: A contemporary history 
of the Swedish banking industry and its’ performance management systems’ discusses 
Swedish commercial banks in general and focuses particularly on how the four large 
commercial banks (SEB, Handelsbanken, Nordea, and Swedbank) in Sweden have adapted 
their performance management systems to altering external pressures over the deregulations’ 
first quarter of a century. Relying on multiple data sources the study applies an institutional 
entrepreneurship approach (Arroyo, 2012) to analyze PMS’s change. The findings of this 
paper indicate that regulatory change seems to have had a limited effect on the PMSs of the 
investigated banks. 
What is next? 
In writing this thesis a number of interesting research themes have been identified as 
promising for the remainder of my Ph.D. process. Below I will briefly elaborate on a few of 
these, which I suspect will keep me occupied for many years to come. Firstly, since different 
bank branch offices commonly generate a disproportionate amount of either assets or 
liabilities (i.e. they are either net funds generators or net funds users), the bank must decide 
how to divide the net interest income among branches. This is commonly done through the 
use of transfer pricing mechanisms, which could have strong effects on employee behavior 
(see e.g. Kimball, 1997 for an extended discussion). During the interviews, several of the 
respondents did discuss the issue of transfer pricing as a particularly complex area, not least in 
relation to the new regulatory framework. This is an area that I would like to study more 
deeply. 
Secondly, both essays of this thesis show that sales focus has become an important aspect 
of the banks’ business. Still, the relationship between a greater sales focus and profitability is 
complex, not least because too much focus on sales may lead to banks that take on excessive 
credit risk. Thus, it would be interesting to investigate the relationship between sales-focus 
and long-term profitability in banks, more in depth. 
Thirdly, the role of savings banks on the modern banking market is an interesting area for 
future research. In times of great turbulence on the financial markets, the need for research 
that increases our understanding of the constituents for a sustainable financial sector is vital. 
Do savings banks add to the stability of the financial system or are they just a historical 
aberration on its way to extinction? With respect to the findings of essay one, the external 
pressures on savings banks to become more and more like commercial banks are gradually 
increasing, and now is the time to investigate whether this is desirable or not. 
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Finally, the re-regulation of the financial market raises many questions. One that I find 
particularly interesting is whether the new regulation will be the remedy for the many claims 
of mismanagement directed at banks, or if it will only transfer the responsibility of controlling 
the financial institutions back to regulators. If the latter is true, it is important to answer the 
question of whether regulators are really better equipped at controlling banks than are bank 
managers. Reflecting on the experiences from Essay 2, it seems like crises initiate PMS’s 
change (partly by change of management), while (de)regulation creates explanations and 
perhaps even excuses for performance failures. The deregulations were used to explain the 
need for growth in the banking industry during the 1980s and the current re-regulation is used 
to motivate a centralization of the banks’ operations. However, while the financial crisis in the 
early 1990s was linked to PMSs failure, the current crisis has partly been linked to a 
regulatory failure, i.e. a transfer of the responsibility and accountability from banks to 
regulators. Further research is needed to either confirm or reject this observation. 
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Appendix A. Useful literature concerning the Swedish banking industry  
Almost three decades have passed since the credit ceiling was abolished in November 
1985 (commonly referred to as ‘The November Revolution’). Only five years after this major 
deregulatory initiative, Sweden was hit by a severe financial crisis, which would alter the 
structure of the banking market considerably. A large number of publications cover the 
deregulations and the Swedish financial. Many of these are referred to extensively throughout 
the two essays but a few will be mentioned here; either because they have not been referred to 
in the text but still have had an important influence on my understanding, or in order to assist 
others in search of literature on this time-period. Larsson (1998) gives a comprehensive 
historical account of the developments of the Swedish financial system during the 20
th
 
century. In Bergendahl (1989), several distinguished people from the banking industry give 
their view on the future of banking in relation to regulations, the market, and management 
control. Larsson & Sjögren (1995) discuss the background to the Swedish financial crisis in 
the 1990s. Going back to the mid-1960s the authors use a broad approach to analyze the 
reasons behind the crisis and the actions that took Sweden out of the crises. Lindgren, 
Wallander & Sjöberg (1994) discuss the causes, consequences, and lessons from the Swedish 
financial crisis. Rydbeck (1993) is a report about the legal responsibility of the board of 
directors of Nordbanken (later Nordea). As the former CEO of the largest Swedish savings 
bank; Första Sparbanken, Pettersson (1993) discuss the Swedish financial crisis from his 
perspective. Carlsson & Nyblom (2008) discuss the credit losses of Swedish banks from 1988 
to 1995. During the crises, several of the Swedish banks created so called ‘bad banks’ to 
which a substantial part of the bad credits were transferred in order to give the viable part of 
the bank a fresh start and Bergström, Englund & Thorell (2002) describe the creation, 
operation, and liquidation of Securum, the largest bad bank in Sweden (created by 
Nordbanken). 
In addition to the literature on commercial banks there is a strand of publications that 
deals specifically with mutual banks (savings banks and member banks). In four books 
Körberg (1999; 2003; 2006; 2010) discuss different periods in the history of the savings 
banks movement. Eriksson (2006) has written about the Independent Savings Banks 
Association (which today is called the Swedish Savings Banks Association). Bergendahl & 
Lindblom (2008) evaluate the performance of Swedish savings banks between 1997 and 2001. 
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Lars Silver has written several publications about Swedish and European savings banks. In his 
dissertation Olsson, 2009 discusses whether savings banks have a purpose in the modern 
banking system and to what extent they succeed in creating excess returns for their 
stakeholders. Historically both the savings banks and the member banks have played an 
important role on the Swedish banking market. However, in the aftermath of the Swedish 
financial crisis the eleven largest savings banks merged into Sparbanken Sverige AB, and all 
member banks merged into Föreningsbanken AB. These two banks were gradually 
commercialized and in 1997 they merged to form FöreningsSparbanken AB, which today is 
named Swedbank (see Essay 1 for an extended discussion). Today there are only two small 
member banks in Sweden but readers interested in the history of the Swedish member banks 
may be referred to Åsling (2002). 
The literature that covers the period after the Swedish financial crisis is diverse and there 
are a number of non-academic books that may be of great interest to anyone interested in the 
Swedish banking industry. Some of these are listed in Table 1 below together with a selection 
of academic books, dissertations, and articles. The list is not intended to be exhaustive in any 
way but has been of great importance for me to reach a better understanding of the Swedish 
banking industry. The list may also serve as a shortcut for others interested in the Swedish 
banking industry. 
 
Table 1. Selected publications on the Swedish banking industry 
Type of publication Title Year Author/s Content 
Academic references         
Booklet 
Prissättning av 
betalningstjänster 
1990 Ted Lindblom 
This booklet discusses bank 
pricing strategies during a 
period when Swedish banks 
tried to increase income 
generation through fees. 
 
Booklet 
Stadshypotek i 
Göteborgs och Bohus 
län 1983-1992 
1994 
Anders Bergland & 
Johan Blume 
 
 
Booklet 
Stadshypotek AB - 
Ett nytt bolag på en 
ny marknad 
1995 
Anders Bergland & 
Johan Blume  
Booklet 
Handelsbanken 
förvärv av 
Stadshypotek 
1999 
Anders Bergland & 
Johan Blume 
These three booklets discuss 
the developments of 
Stadshypotek, a Swedish 
mortgage company, which 
eventually was sold to 
Handelsbanken. 
 
Paper 
Cross-Border Bank 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions in the 
EU 
2002 
Ted Lindblom & 
Christopher von Koch 
This paper analyzes the 
merger between Nordbanken 
and the Finish bank Merita 
from a balanced scorecard 
approach. 
 
Book 
Merging across 
borders - People, 
cultures and politics 
2003 
Anne-Marie 
Söderberg & Eero 
Vaara 
The book discuss the case of 
Nordea 
Dissertations         
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Ph.D. 
Ägarstyrning av 
utländska banker i 
Central - och 
Östeuropa 
2005 Christopher von Koch 
Discuss the development of 
foreign ownership in East-
European banks and how 
foreign ownership affects 
profitability, growth, and 
risk in these banks. 
 
Ph.D. 
Payment Efficiency 
and Payment Pricing 
-  Four Essays 
2007 Magnus Willesson 
Discuss how electronic 
payments and developments 
in technology have provided 
banks with new ways to 
price payments and increase 
payment efficiency. 
 
Ph.D. 
Essays on 
Performance and 
Growth in Swedish 
Banking 
2007 Pål Sjöberg 
Empirically analyzes 
performance and growth in 
Swedish banking 
Ph.D. 
Governing 
Innovation - Internet 
and Renewal in 
Swedish Banks 
2008 Zia Mansouri 
Discuss the strategies that 
Swedish banks have adapted 
to govern innovations in 
relation to the emergance of 
the Internet 
Licentiate 
Tillsynsmyndigheten, 
tillsynen och vår 
beredskap inför en 
finanskris 
2011 Hans-Olof Bergqvist 
Describe the Swedish 
Financial Services 
Authority.  
Non-academic references         
Biography En laber bris 1999 Björn Wahlström 
Björn Wahlström has held 
several senior positions in 
large Swedish firms, and as 
the Chairman of the Board 
in Nordbanken from 1990 he 
was an important actor of 
the bank's reshaping. 
 
Anthology 
Bank, kund och 
samhälle i 
globaliseringens tid 
2003 Eds. Bo Ekman 
A number of distinguished 
people from the banking 
industry discuss various 
issues in the relation to the 
future of banking. 
 
Biography Jacobs Stege 2008 Jacob Palmstierna 
Jacob Palmstierna has held 
senior positions within both 
SEB and Nordea, and he was 
an important actor in the 
reshaping of Nordbanken 
after the Swedish financial 
crisis. 
 
Biography 
Veni Vedi Redi - En 
finansmans 
bekännelser 
2011 Knut Ramel 
As an investment banker in 
London, Knut Ramel, 
discuss his experiences from 
this competitive and money-
intense business. 
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Case description 
Decentralization -
Why and How to 
make it Work  
2003 Jan Wallander 
The previous CEO of 
Handelsbanken discusses the 
way in which he led the 
reformation of 
Handelsbanken and the basis 
of their successful 
management model. 
 
Case description 
Uppstickaren - 
Skandibankens första 
tio år 
2004 
Ingrid Kindahl & 
Annika Rosell 
A case description of how 
Skandiabanken entered the 
Swedish banking market 
after the Swedish financial 
crisis. 
 
Case description 
Fritt fall- Spelet om 
Swedbank 
2010 Birgitta Forsberg 
A description of the situation 
in Swedbank during the 
current financial crisis 
Case description 
Den stora 
bankhärvan: 
finansparet Hagberg 
och Qvibergs 
uppgång och fall: + 
HQ 
2011 Carolina Neurath 
A description of the fall of 
HQ investment bank during 
the current financial crisis 
Report 
Shareholder Value in 
Banking 
1999 Hans Dahlborg 
Hans Dahlborg, previous 
CEO and Chairman of the 
Board in Nordea discuss his 
view on the shareholder 
value concept in banking 
 
Appendix B. Interview guide 
About the Respondent 
 Background in the bank 
 Background outside the bank 
Performance 
 How would you describe the performance of the bank and how it has changed over the 
years that you have been active in the bank? 
 If the performance has changed, what would you say caused the change? 
 What has been/is considered important in the bank  what made you sleep good/bad 
at night? 
Strategy 
 What have been the key strategic issues in the bank over time? 
o Growth? Diversification? Customer focus? Costs? 
 How was/is the strategy communicated to the employees? 
 For whom did you run the bank i.e. who are the key stakeholder/s? 
Organizational culture 
 How do/did you want to be perceived by customers/the public? Why? 
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 What capacities do/did you highlight as good/bad among your employees? Why? 
 How and why did it change over the years?  
 How would you describe the bank’s organizational culture? Has it changed over time? 
How and why? 
 After a merger what was done to create a common culture? 
Organizational structure 
 How were/are decisions coordinated in the bank for example in a credit decision? 
 How was/is responsibility allocated? Cost accountability, results accountability etc.? 
 Please describe any major organizational restructurings during your time in the bank 
and what caused the restructuring?  
 What functions are allocated to the head office and what functions are handled at the 
branch level? Have the functions been moved during your period at the bank, 
how/why? 
Operating systems and procedures 
 What type of information systems do you have and how did you develop these 
systems? 
 How did/do you handle regulatory change and how was it integrated into the systems? 
 Did/do you think that the employee should actively seek information to support a 
decision or should all the information be available at the employee’s disposal? 
 When do employees need access to information? Should everyone have access to 
everything or should it be limited? Has the information sharing policy changed over 
the years? 
 When do you consider a customer profitable, how did/do you measure customer 
profitability? Has it changed? If so, why? 
 If any information is missing, how was/is it handled? 
 
 Which are the main key performance indicators in the bank and how are they used? 
Have they changed over time? If so, why? 
 How did/do you set the targets at the bank? Are there primarily short-term (less than a 
year) or long term. Are the targets flexible or strict? 
 How did/do you evaluate the targets? At an individual, group, or business level? What 
did/do the evaluation process look like? Please give examples. Has it changed over 
time? 
 What happened/s to employees that fail to deliver on the targets? 
 What type of incentive schemes did/do you apply at the bank?  
 Has any of the above changed over time and if so why? 
Training and development 
 Please describe the procedures for employee training. Has it changed over time, if so 
why? 
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 What has been/is the main focus in the employee training programs, what do they 
learn? Has it changed over time, if so why? 
 What were/are the potential career paths in the bank? Do you have a formal career-
path in the bank? Has it changed over time, if so why? 
Finally, 
Is there anything you would like to add? 
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Performance Management Systems in Swedish Savings Banks – A 
longitudinal study through the deregulations’ first quarter of a century 
 
Viktor Lundberg 
Department of Business Administration, School of Business, Economics and Law, Goteborg University, 
Box 610, 405-30 Goteborg, Sweden 
1. Introduction 
Over the past three decades the world of banking has changed considerably. 
Deregulation, internationalization, financial crises and reregulation are just some of the many 
changes that have affected banking business (Bátiz-Lazo & Wood, 2003; Power, 2004; 
Larson et al., 2011). Under the influence of their external environment, banks have become 
larger, more diversified, international and competitive (Goddard et al., 2007; Wilson et al., 
2010) prompting the need for new sources of income, complex tools for risk assessment and 
risk mitigation as well as greater cost- and productivity consciousness (Muir et al., 2011:94). 
In the middle of this turbulent environment we find the trustee savings bank; a small, 
local, and risk-averse player with no owners entitled to its profits. Traditionally, the main 
objectives of savings banks have been to foster savings, develop the local economy, and to 
carry out social works in the local area. However, altered competitive conditions and the 
increasingly shareholder-oriented nature of banking, after the deregulations in the 1980s, have 
induced substantial changes in the legal, economic, and strategic models of savings banks 
compelling them to adapt and respond to external market pressures and meet tests of 
efficiency and performance (Carbo & Williams, 2000:135; Silver, 2007; García-Cestona & 
Surroca, 2008; Olsson, 2009). 
Several studies have investigated the performance of savings banks from a stakeholder 
perspective to evaluate whether the performance of savings banks differs from that of 
commercial banks (see e.g. Carbo & Williams, 2000; Bergendahl & Lindblom, 2008; García-
Cestona & Surroca, 2008). These studies show that European savings banks generally 
perform well in comparison to their commercial peers indicating that there is still room for 
savings banks in today’s competitive banking environment. Less common in the literature are 
studies that try to understand how savings banks manage their performance i.e. what type of 
tools that have been adopted by savings banks to manage their performance and in what way 
the altering external pressures, over the deregulations’ first quarter of a century1, have 
affected these tools?  
Savings banks are interesting from a performance management perspective, not least 
with respect to the obvious incompatibility between the increasingly shareholder-oriented 
nature of banking and the traditional main objectives of the savings banks discussed by e.g. 
Schuster (2000). Moreover, the small size, local character, and risk averseness of the savings 
banks are factors that stand in stark contrast to the recent trends in banking, indicating that 
savings banks do in fact behave differently than their commercial peers. Despite these 
dissimilarities, savings banks seem to manage their performance well, pleading the question 
of how this is done in such a hostile environment. 
                                                 
1
 The deregulations’ first quarter of a century refers to the 25 years that have passed since the main deregulatory 
initiative in Sweden (i.e. the elimination of the credit ceiling) was taken in November 1985. 
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The present chapter provides some insights into this question by studying the 
performance management systems (PMSs)
2
 of Swedish savings banks. More specifically it 
examines how and why Swedish savings banks have adapted their strategies, structures, and 
management accounting and control elements to altering external pressures over the 
deregulations’ first quarter of a century. The study is based on interview data from four 
Swedish savings banks and key representatives of the Swedish Savings Banks Association 
(SSBA). To corroborate the interviews, additional data was acquired both through external 
material (e.g. annual reports, relevant academic and business journals, and books) and internal 
documents received from respondents. An analytical framework that builds on new 
institutional theory and specifically aimed at explaining banks’ responses to alterations in the 
external pressures is used to discuss the findings. Generalizability is not the main objective 
here, but instead the study seek to increase our understanding of PMS’s change in Swedish 
savings banks, which can serve as an indicator of issues that are relevant to other settings. 
In many ways Sweden provides an excellent environment for this type of study. Being a 
small and open economy, Sweden has followed the general trend in banking over the period 
for this study. Moreover, the long-standing relationship between academia and the Swedish 
business society provides an opportunity to study organizations from the inside which is 
difficult to achieve elsewhere. Finally, Swedish savings banks have a long tradition of low 
staff turnover, providing for access to expert respondents who can account as witnesses of the 
developments over time. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. A brief historical background of the 
Swedish savings banks is given to set the stage, after which the theoretical framework is 
presented. Next the research method is outlined and in the two following parts the findings are 
reported and discussed. Finally, some concluding remarks are made. 
2. Swedish savings banks 
During the 19
th
 century the number of savings banks increased rapidly and by the turn of 
the century more than 300 savings banks were operating on the Swedish market. After the 
financial crisis in the 1920s the savings banks prospered on behalf of the distressed 
commercial banks (Larsson, 1998). The success of the savings banks continued and in 1942 a 
joint commercial bank (Sparbankernas Bank) was formed to handle foreign exchange and 
credit transactions (Polster, 2004). Together with the Swedish Savings Banks Association 
(SSBA) and Sparbankernas Bank the savings banks developed common institutions to handle 
data processing, auditing, real estate brokerage, and so on which made the savings banks’ 
movement seem united (Körberg, 2010). However, as the savings banks grew stronger and 
more competitive an internal consolidation debate was initiated in the late 1960s. It was 
argued (primarily by the large savings banks) that mergers were necessary in order to compete 
successfully with the commercial banks. The debate intensified during the 1970s and rendered 
a long series of mergers, reducing the number of savings banks from approximately 400 in the 
mid-1960s to 164
3
 in 1980 (Körberg, 2010).  
Körberg (2010) describes the years from 1980 to 1995 as the most dramatic and radical 
period of change in the history of Swedish savings banks. On a macro-level, a complete 
reformation of the financial legislation and the worst financial crisis since the 1920s 
contributed to this notion. In addition, the conversion of a large part of the savings bank group 
                                                 
2
 Based on Ferreira & Otley (2009), performance management systems is defined as all the tools managers use in 
implementing the main objectives of the organization The definition includes both tools used to control 
employees (management control systems) and information used for decision support (management accounting 
systems). 
3
 The Swedish Bankers Association 
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into public limited companies, through the forming of Sparbanken Sverige AB, was a major 
factor in reshaping the savings banks’ role on the Swedish financial market. However, the 
period after 1995 has continued to be extremely turbulent for the Swedish savings banks. 
Increased competition, new regulatory frameworks, the merger between Sparbanken Sverige 
AB and Föreningsbanken AB into FöreningsSparbanken AB (FSB)
4
 in 1997, additional 
mergers and conversions and a worldwide financial crisis have characterized the second part 
of the deregulations’ first quarter of a century. 
Today there are 63 savings banks in Sweden, 49 of which operate under the Savings 
Banks Act (1987:619), 14 have converted to joint stock banks. Out of the 14 converted banks, 
nine are fully owned by foundations and five are owned partly by a foundation and partly by 
Swedbank (SSBA, 2011). The nine banks that are fully owned by a foundation operate under 
similar terms as those that have not converted, and this paper will focus on these 58 savings 
banks that commonly refer to themselves as independent savings banks (ISBs). Since most of 
the ISBs still have a relationship with Swedbank, both as customers and as owners, it is 
inevitable to provide some evidence about Swedbank and issues concerning the cooperation 
with Swedbank will appear throughout the paper. 
3. Theoretical Framework 
This chapter use new institutional sociology (NIS) (see Scott, 2008 for an excellent 
review) to explain how the ISBs seek to obtain stability and legitimacy by conforming to 
institutional pressures issued from the state, professions and the collectively shared norms in 
society. Within NIS, institutional isomorphism is used to describe the mechanisms which 
forces one unit in a population to adopt systems and procedures in order to resemble other 
units that face the same set of environmental conditions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983:150). 
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) discuss three mechanisms through which institutional 
isomorphism occur; coercive, mimetic, and normative. 
Coercive isomorphism refers to a broad spectrum of both formal and informal pressures 
exerted on organizations, or organizational units, to adopt systems and procedures issued by 
other organizations or units of which they are dependent. Regulation is perhaps the most 
tangible coercive pressure and Deephouse (1996) shows that bank strategy is indeed related to 
the coercive pressure of bank regulators. Apart from the regulators, the ISBs are exposed to 
coercive pressures from Swedbank, as their key product provider and main supplier of 
information systems. Furthermore, even though the ISBs are not prohibited, by law, to expand 
outside their local area it would be considered an offensive move that might upset the co-
operation on a national level (Olsson, 2009). 
According to DiMaggio & Powell (1983), mimetic isomorphism follows from an 
uncertain environment in which organizations seek legitimacy by modeling themselves or 
other successful organizations. It is commonly argued that banks operate in uncertain 
environments (e.g. Hussain & Hoque, 2002; Hussain, 2003; 2005; Adler, 2011) and 
McKendrick (1995) shows that large and successful banks serve as important role models for 
other banks. Several studies have showed that banks often use benchmarking to deal with the 
high uncertainty (Cobb et al., 1995; Helliar et al., 2002; Adler, 2011) and the ISBs in Sweden 
are expected to follow similar practices, indicating that they will adapt their PMSs to resemble 
those of other successful banks. 
The third mechanism, normative isomorphism, stems from the idea of professionalization 
i.e. that members of the same profession often come from the same background (e.g. social 
                                                 
4
 FSB was renamed to Swedbank in 2006 and has since the merger been one of the four large commercial banks 
in Sweden. For simplicity Swedbank will be used throughout the remainder of the paper. 
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class and education), with similar ideas about how to produce the organizational procedures 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983:152). The authors further argue that industries with a service or 
financial orientation tend to have a particularly high degree of ‘filtering’ in which employees 
are recruited from the same universities and share similar attributes, hence ‘they will tend to 
view problems in a similar fashion, see the same policies, procedures and structures as 
normatively sanctioned and legitimated, and approach decisions in much the same way’ 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983:153). The dramatic change that the Swedish banking industry has 
gone through over the deregulations’ first quarter of a century is likely to have affected the 
notion of a professional banker within the ISBs. To account for such alterations of the 
normative pressure, the ISBs can be expected to adjust their recruitment processes and 
training and development practices. These are important components of the PMSs as they 
serve to up-skill and standardize employee behavior (Adler, 2011) as well as aligning the 
aspirations of individuals with that of the organization (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007). 
Failure to comply with any of the above mentioned pressures would result in 
repercussions (e.g. financial penalties from regulators and loss of legitimacy among important 
stakeholders) and the ISBs are, therefore, likely to adapt their PMSs if these pressures change. 
However, although NIS has been used extensively to explain why firms adopt their PMSs to 
external pressures it does not consider how those PMSs evolve within organizations (Ribeiro 
& Scapens, 2006; Arroyo, 2012) and how organizations respond to altering isomorphic 
pressures (Oliver, 1991; Munir et al., 2011). Several attempts have been made to develop 
frameworks that address these issues but according to Munir et al (2011) these have primarily 
been aimed at the manufacturing industry and the authors emphasize that the frameworks 
offers limited help in studying banks because of operational specificities which are different 
from the manufacturing industry (see also Lau & Tan, 1998; Larsson et al., 2011). 
Accordingly, Munir et al (2011) propose a framework specifically aimed at analyzing ‘the 
factors influencing changes in PMSs and the organizational responses to change efforts’ in 
banks (Munir et al., 2011:108). The model presented in Figure 1 below draws on the 
framework proposed by Munir et al (2011) but as they refer to performance measurement 
systems a few adaptions are made here, which are discussed next. 
3.1 Introducing performance management systems to the model 
Recently, scholars have emphasized the problem of separating specific management 
accounting techniques (such as the performance measurement system) from other features of 
the performance management system since these are commonly interdependent (e.g. Otley, 
1999; Malmi & Brown, 2008; Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Adler, 2011). In addition, it has been 
argued that this separation expands the gap between research and practice (e.g. Nixon & 
Burns, 2005:265; Berry et al., 2009). For those reasons a broader and more practice-oriented 
approach has been suggested under the frame of performance management systems (PMSs) 
(see Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Adler, 2011). Since the primary motivation of this chapter is to 
examine how and why Swedish savings banks have adapted to altering external pressures, it 
was believed that the field research would benefit from a broad framework that was readily 
understood by practitioners. Accordingly, the fourth box shows the PMSs framework in a 
simplified version of that provided by Adler (2011). There are four main control mechanisms 
intended to support the strategy implementing process; organizational culture, organizational 
structure, operating systems and procedures, and training and development. Broadbent & 
Laughlin (2009) argues that the way in which the different components of the PMSs interact 
and are utilized will differ depending on the organizational context. This means that if the 
context change, organizations are likely to adapt their PMSs and Oliver (1991) develops a 
typology to describe the various strategies that organizations seem to apply when institutional 
pressures change. The organizational responses are described as a continuum ranging from the 
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most passive response (acquiesce), in which the organization will follow taken for granted 
norms, mimic institutional models and obey rules and norms, to the most active response 
(manipulate) where the organization will actively seek to change or exert power over the 
source of the institutional pressures. 
Previous studies show that having no owners provide the top management of savings 
banks with an opportunity to pursue a personal agenda (Crespí et al., 2004; Silver, 2007). This 
opportunity may have consequences for the ISBs’ responses to altering external pressures as 
individual managers could have motives that deviate from the best solution for the bank 
(Forsell, 1992; Olsson, 2009). For example, the ISBs might be prone to utilize the more 
passive responses if these require less work, or exploiting concealment tactics i.e. disguising 
their actual PMSs practices to appear legitimate. According to Oliver (1991) such responses 
often materialize in terms of a decoupling between the internal work activities and the formal 
structures, and may, therefore, result in PMSs inertia rather than change. In the following 
section the framework used to organize the findings and analyze the data is presented, the 
model builds on Munir et al (2011) but, as will be elaborated on below, the PMSs framework 
also affects the relationship between the different dimensions in the model. 
3.2 An analytical framework to analyze PMS’s change in banks 
The first box in Figure 1 shows the macro-level environment and includes factors that 
have been commonly cited in the banking literature as influencing how banks are organized 
(e.g. Helliar et al., 2002). These factors primarily affect the PMSs indirectly through the 
institutional pressures. For example a political decision to alter the bank regulation will 
change the coercive pressure. The bank may respond to the pressure by obeying the new 
regulation and changing its’ PMSs to align with the new regulation. As discussed by 
Wahlström (2009) banks may also respond to new regulations by ‘window-dressing’, i.e. by 
appearing as if they follow the new regulations, but avoiding to actually implementing the 
new routines into the PMSs practices. Oliver (1991:174) further argues that ‘an 
organization’s responses to the institutional environment will not only influence 
organizational performance, they may also influence the criteria, measures, or standards 
used by institutional constituents to evaluate performance’, i.e. the bank may try to influence 
the politicians or regulators thereby explaining the arrows from the strategic responses to the 
top two boxes. 
Based on the strategic response the bank may or may not decide to reformulate its 
strategy, which in turn can affect the main control mechanisms (Simons, 1995; Chenhall, 
2003; Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Adler, 2011). Although the strategic response could initiate 
PMS’s change the relationship is not unidirectional, since the banks’ existing PMSs will have 
an inherent effect on the strategic response (Oliver, 1991). For example, those banks that 
already have PMSs congruent with the new external pressure, are more likely to respond 
passively, whereas banks that needs to make large changes in their PMSs may even try to 
actively oppose the introduction of a new pressure. 
To identify responses from ISBs when external pressures alter, the analysis outlined in 
the following sections is divided into two steps. 
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4. Research Approach 
The first step was to identify alterations in the institutional pressures exerted on the ISBs 
in Sweden. The theory suggests that when the macro-level environment change the 
institutional pressures are likely to be affected. Accordingly, a review of the relevant literature 
on the macro-level environment over the past decades, with specific focus on banks, was 
conducted. The findings are presented in subsection 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. The next step was to 
conduct interviews and describe the ISBs’ responses to alterations in the institutional 
pressures, and this procedure will be discussed next.  
4.1 Data sources and selection of ISBs 
Although the interviews were used as the prime data source to analyze the IBSs’ 
responses to alterations in the external pressures, both internal documents (such as internal 
performance reports, protocols, and other material received by respondents) and the external 
data helped to corroborate and elaborate on the interview findings. The longitudinal character 
of the study made such data triangulation an important instrument to improve the internal 
validity (see Ryan et al., 2002), since respondents were asked to reflect upon things that 
Source: Adapted from Munir et al (2011:98) 
Figure 1 
Framework to examine change in the PMSs of banks 
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happened a long time ago and may suffer from memory bias (see Schacter, 1999 for an 
extended discussion). 
Four ISBs were selected, in correspondence with a key representative for the savings 
bank group, based on two main criteria: size and disparity; a brief presentation of the ISBs is 
given below. 
 Ulricehamns Sparbank (USB) was founded in 1852 and is located in a small 
municipality with 25,000 residents. Over the past 50 years USB has operated with 
one main office and three branch offices
5
. In 2011 USB had 50 employees, a total 
balance sheet size of SEK3.9 bn and an operating income of SEK56 million. 
 Sparbanken Allingsås AB (ASB) started operating in 1833 and is located in the 
proximity of Gothenburg in a municipality with 40,000 residents. ASB has four 
branch offices. In 2010 it was decided that ASB should convert to become a 
limited company. However, ASB is fully owned by a foundation and is still 
operating as an ISB. In 2011 ASB had 100 employees, a total balance sheet size 
of SEK8.2 bn and an operating income of SEK120 million. 
 Sparbanken Skaraborg AB (SSB) started its operations in 1847. The bank is 
located in a region with approximately 50,000 residents and as of 2011 the bank 
has five branch offices (as one branch office was closed). In 2011 SSB had just 
over 90 employees, a total balance sheet size of about SEK8 bn and an operating 
income of SEK120 million. 
 Orusts Sparbank (OSB) was founded in 1887 and is located on one of the largest 
islands in Sweden. In 2011 OSB had four branch offices, close to 50 employees, a 
total balance sheet size of about SEK5.5 bn and an operating income of SEK100 
million. 
4.2 Conducting the interviews 
Site visits were conducted at each of the four banks during which semi-structured 
interviews were held with senior managers. The respondents had generally held a senior 
position within the bank for more than two decades. The interviews followed an interview 
guide that is highly informed by the questions developed by Ferreira & Otley (2009) and is 
divided into six categories; performance, strategy, organizational culture, organizational 
structure, operating systems and procedures, and training and development. All interviews 
were held in Swedish
6
 and lasted between two and three hours. In addition, interviews were 
held with two representatives of the SSBA and a controller at Swedbank who is responsible 
for collecting performance data and preparing performance reports for the ISBs. 
4.3 Data analysis 
The six categories of the interview guide formed the basis for the analysis. Further 
coding is not done but similar to for example Arena et al (2010) the empirical material is 
instead analyzed textually in which emergent themes and contingent causalities, pertaining to 
the conceptual elements (responses to institutional pressures), were highlighted. A common 
problem in interview-studies is the vast amount of empirical material and the obvious need to 
make choices among the many variables that may appear crucial (Sigglekow, 2007). To 
account for this problem many studies rely on multi-author analysis in which each author 
make individual analysis, which is than compared. This approach was not available in the 
                                                 
5
 It should be noted that two of the branch offices were closed in 2012. 
6
 The paper contains citations both from the interviews and the complementary data. These citations have been 
translated by the author. 
29 
 
present study but similar to for example Adler (2011) the analysis has instead been cross-
checked with the respondents. 
5. Findings 
The findings are presented in three subsections below, following a chronological order, 
where each subsection is divided into two parts. The first part describes the macro-level 
environment and the institutional pressures during the 1980s, 1990s, and the 2000s. The 
second part focuses more specifically on the performance management systems and the 
interviewed ISBs’ responses to alterations in the external pressures. 
5.1 Altering external pressures in the 1980s 
Throughout the entire postwar period Swedish banks remained under strict governmental 
control. However, in the 1970s the market-oriented view was gradually entering the Swedish 
economy. During the 1970s and early 1980s the Swedish economy was characterized by weak 
governmental finances and by the mid-1980s, Sweden had experienced more than a decade of 
high inflation. Between 1973 and 1982 the currency was devaluated six times providing for 
consistently high interest rates (Englund, 1999). The weak government finances, the 
internationalization of the money market, and technological developments provided for the 
creation of innovative financial instruments, which made several features of the regulatory 
framework superfluous (Larsson, 1998, SOU 2000:11). As a result, the government decided 
to follow the deregulatory wave (initiated by Reagan in the US and Thatcher in the UK) and 
in just a few years between 1983 and 1986 the Swedish financial markets went through a 
complete deregulation (e.g. Larsson, 1998). 
For savings banks in Sweden the deregulation started in 1969 when the regulation, 
forbidding savings banks to compete with commercial banks, was abolished. However, it was 
not until the deregulations in the mid-1980s that the savings banks really started to advance 
into the same areas as their commercial peers (Larsson, 1998). Even prior to the most 
important deregulatory initiative (the elimination of the credit ceiling) in November 1985, 
discussions about the future of Swedish savings banks were on top of the agenda within the 
savings banks group. It was communicated in an internal memorandum, published in the 
spring of 1985 that: ‘The banking system has left the sheltered and tranquil environment, of 
which we have been spoiled, and is now subject to the same competitive working conditions 
applicable to the commercial and industrial sectors. In our opinion, the new banking 
environment will place great demands on the adjustment of costs and structure as well as 
leading to a tough prioritization of provision-based business in order to compensate for lower 
net interest income.’ (Körberg, 2010:69). 
The latter part of the 1980s was characterized by exceptionally high demand for credit, 
increasing prices on the property market, and a tax legislation favoring property speculation 
(Englund, 1999). During this period the savings banks started a huge credit expansion and 
from 1984 to 1988 the savings banks tripled the number of loans and more than quadrupled 
the level of credit to the business sector (Larsson & Sjögren, 1995). In this decade the 
consolidation debate, mentioned above, reached a new phase and in 1982, Första Sparbanken 
was formed through a merger of two of the largest savings banks in Sweden (Sparbanken 
Stockholm and Länssparbanken Göteborg). A few years later five relatively large savings 
banks merged to form the first regional savings bank (Sparbanken Alfa); and during the same 
period an additional set of regional savings banks was formed. The merger trend made a 
number of the smaller savings banks fear for their future existence and they decided to form 
the independent savings banks association (ISBA) in 1985. The purpose of the ISBA was to 
gather the strengths of the smaller savings banks in order to act as a united front in key issues. 
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Initially the ISBA contained 80 of the smallest savings banks, but in 1994 ten additional 
members were incorporated (Eriksson, 2005). In 1985 there were a total of seven regional 
savings banks, seven syndicate savings banks, 12 middle sized savings banks, and 89 small 
savings banks (Körberg, 2010). 
The ISBs’ responses to the altering external pressures in the 1980s 
The economic boom during the latter part of the 1980s delayed the expected cost savings 
(discussed in the memorandum). Instead growth seemed to characterize the years after the 
deregulations. As noted above, the savings banks’ lending increased drastically and limited 
attention was paid to risk. The credit manager of ASB comments the years after the 
deregulations in the following manner: ‘Suddenly we [banks] had all the money in the world 
at our disposal and there were no routines or ideas of how to handle this new situation. An 
interest rate war broke out and the profitability dropped drastically. A common way of 
reasoning at that time was that if I provide a credit of SEK10 million and make a two percent 
margin I might just as well increase the credit to a SEK100 million and earn a 1.5 percent 
margin; there was no consideration of the risks involved.’. 
The growth strategy during the latter part of the 1980s had a number of characteristics 
described both in previous literature and by the respondents. Firstly, the economic boom made 
the demand for credit exceptionally high and since the credit ceiling was abolished a fierce 
competition for credit issuing arose among the banks. A common way of reasoning was that; 
if we do not issue the credit, someone else will. Not only was there a lack of proper routines 
to handle this new situation but the banks frequently ignored the existing routines to be able to 
issue the credits in a timely fashion. 
Secondly, although growth was high in all regions of the country it was more tangible in 
the larger cities. For the savings banks this meant an abandoning of the church tower 
principle, i.e. instead of relying on relationship lending primarily to the local private market, 
several of the savings banks moved outside their local region and started issuing credits to 
opaque firms in the big city areas. 
Thirdly, the internal structural debate disunited the savings bank group. The larger 
savings banks believed in creating a joint-stock holding company under which all central 
functions, were to be organized. On the other side, the smaller savings banks, untied under the 
ISBA, acted to protect and maintain the savings bank model and to remain independent. This 
development indicates a clear difference in the organizational goals and cultures among the 
savings banks. The larger banks emphasized the importance of scale and scope through 
mergers in order to stay competitive on the banking market whereas the smaller banks wanted 
to remain independent in order to serve their local markets. 
Finally, the transition from focusing almost exclusively on the private market to entering 
the business segment compelled the savings banks to diversify their product portfolios. Both 
the complexity of the new products and the difficulty in assessing business creditors placed 
greater demands on the training and development of employees. From 1985 to 1989 the ‘other 
staff costs’ increased from less than three percent of total costs to more than four percent 
(SCB, 1989). 
In sum, the changing macro-level environment clearly led to a shift in the institutional 
pressures exerted on the savings banks. The larger savings banks responded through mergers 
and growth whereas the smaller savings banks fought to remain independent and preserve the 
traditional values of the savings banks movement. One key explanatory factor for these 
divergent strategic responses seems to reside in geographical distance. Savings banks active at 
some distance from the major cities were insulated from the new institutional pressures and 
instead followed the taken-for-granted norms that had traditionally existed in the bank (i.e. the 
church-tower principle). The CEO of OSB gave the following comment: ‘back in the 1980s 
we used to say that new innovations took five years to travel from the big cities to us and ten 
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years to be in full use, today it takes one day for the idea to travel here and maybe a month or 
two until it is in full use’. Thus, even though a gradual shift towards growth existed within the 
smaller savings banks, it was not accompanied with any major changes in the PMSs, which 
remained simplistic until the beginning of the 1990s. 
5.2 Altering external pressures in the 1990s 
The early years of the 1990s were extremely turbulent, not only for the banks but for the 
whole Swedish economy. As the 1990s approached, the economy started to slow down and 
the first signs of weakness in the financial system appeared. In the fall of 1989, the industrial 
output index and the real estate prices started to go down and interest rates started to go up. 
Consequently, credit demand, which had remained exceptionally high during the latter part of 
the 1980s, suddenly began to decrease (Englund, 1999). What initially seemed like a financial 
crisis caused by a downturn on the real estate market spread to the whole Swedish economy 
and the number of bankruptcies quickly increased causing huge credit losses for the banks 
(Larsson & Sjögren, 1995). During this period the Swedish government decided to conduct an 
extensive tax reform called TR 91. Among other things, TR 91 meant a reduction of the 
marginal tax on capital income, making it less favorable to speculate on the property-market, 
and thereby hampering credit demand even further (Agell et al., 1999).  
As the crisis intensified, the keeping of a fixed currency, which had remained an 
important political argument throughout the 1980s, was no longer sustainable. In the autumn 
of 1992, the Riksbank had to increase the overnight rate to 500 percent to defend the Krona 
and then weeks later, on the 19
th
 of November, the Krona was left floating. By the end of 
1993 the overnight interest rate was down to 7.75 per cent, its lowest point in over a decade 
(Englund, 1999; Magnusson, 2002). 
On an international level the creation of the European Union (EU) had regained 
momentum with the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 (Haan et al., 2009). 
The aim of the SEA was to create a complete internal EU market by 1992. In 1992 Sweden 
signed the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA), which meant that Sweden was 
espoused to comply with the EC rules on financial services (Kazarian, 1994).  Among the 
prominent features of the EEA agreement was the provision for free cross-border trade in 
financial services and the freedom to establish credit institutions in all EEA countries. In 
Sweden, foreign banks were permitted to establish subsidiaries from 1986, but with the EEA 
agreement they could also open branches
7
 and the restrictions on foreign ownership were 
removed. Another important feature of the European legal framework was that it 
encompassed the international standards of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(Ems, 1994). Basel I had two purposes: (i) to strengthen the soundness and stability of the 
international banking system and (ii) to reduce competitive inequalities by creating an 
international regulatory standard. Put simply, Basel I required banks to hold a minimum 
capital standard of 8 percent of risk weighted assets
8
. 
Similar to the commercial banks, the credit losses in the savings banks started to increase 
and between 1989 and 1992 the credit losses went from less than a half percent to more than 
six percent of total lending (Larsson & Sjögren, 1995). Under the turbulent years of the crisis, 
several savings banks turned out to have issued loans without proper consideration of risk and 
one of the most affected banks was the largest savings bank; Första Sparbanken. To protect 
some of the savings banks that were hit the worst it was decided that a more unified 
                                                 
7
 A branch can rely on the capital of the parent bank, whereas a subsidiary must have an independent capital base 
(see Ems, 1994) 
8
 http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm accessed 2011-11-04 
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governance structure was needed and in 1992 all units under Sparbanksgruppen AB
9
 were 
merged into a single organization that later became Swedbank (see section 2). In the first 
years after the transformation, eleven savings bank foundations
10
 together with the ISBs 
owned the full common stock in Swedbank. However, as the crisis intensified a share issue 
and several share sales, were conducted in order to avoid a governmental take-over of the 
bank, and in June 1995 Swedbank was listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. From this 
point on, Swedbank became a commercial bank with a product portfolio similar to other 
universal banks albeit with a close cooperation with the ISBs (Eriksson, 2005; Körberg, 
2010). 
During the second half of the 1990s the Swedish economy stabilized, and in the decade 
after the crisis Sweden enjoyed a stronger output growth relative to contemporaneous 
experience in much of the OECD and EU (Davis & Henrekson, 2010). The technological 
development helped increasing productivity and the economic integration increased the 
demand for products and services. The economic integration was boosted in 1995 when 
Sweden entered the EU, and even though Sweden refused the entry into the monetary union 
by referendum in 2003, it still plays a major role in shaping the political economic agenda 
(Magnusson, 2002).  
The M&A trend was one of the most prominent features of banking during the 1990s 
(e.g. Goddard et al., 2007; Wilson et al., 2010). Sweden is no exception and several of the 
large commercial banks expanded through M&As during this period. The forming of 
Swedbank was a result of such a merger with significant effects for the ISBs. In the merger, 
the ISBs were offered to acquire Swedbank’s local branch offices to avoid double-
establishments. However, several of the ISBs lacked the financial strength to acquire the 
branch offices and converted into joint stock banks, with Swedbank as a partner, to afford 
acquisitions. Apart from this event the ISBs had already gone through a long period of 
structural reforms, as discussed above, and between 1992 and 2001 there were only two 
additional mergers
11
 (Olsson, 2009). 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis the number of banks started to increase for the first 
time since the 1950s. The signing of the EEA agreement together with continued deregulatory 
initiatives provided for the entry of foreign players on the Swedish banking market. More 
importantly, from the ISBs’ perspective, the new conditions on the Swedish banking market 
opened up for new banks with a narrow range of products and services to establish operations. 
According to Lindblom & Andersson (1997), the poor reputation of traditional banks after the 
financial crisis, together with the newly established bank guarantee
12
, created an excellent 
opportunity for new banks to enter the Swedish market and from 1994 to 2002 ten niche 
banks started their operations (The Swedish Bankers Association). The entry of these banks 
meant a sharpening of the competition for the savings banks. Not only did the new banks offer 
competitive interest rates but several of them already had branches in the savings banks’ local 
markets since they diversified into banking from insurance or retailing businesses. 
                                                 
9
 Sparbanksgruppen AB was a holding company that was formed in 1990 under which Sparbankernas Bank, 
eleven regional savings banks, and a number of central functions were organized. 
10
 A legislative change in 1991 allowed for savings banks to convert into joint-stock companies and eleven 
regional savings banks converted shortly after the change. Initially these banks were fully owned by individual 
foundations. 
11
 Even prior to the forming of Swedbank a number of savings banks converted into joint stock banks while still 
operated as ISBs (see Eriksson (2005) and Olsson (2009) for extended discussion concerning the reasons for 
converting and detailed descriptions of the banks that chose to convert).  
12
 Sweden introduced the deposit insurance in 1996 through the Deposit Insurance Act (1995:1571) and set the 
insurance to SEK 250,000. In 2008 the amount was changed to SEK 500,000 and from the 31
st
 of December 
2010 it is €100,000 exceeding the new EU minimum of €50,000. 
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The EU membership meant that the gradual shift in financial services from being strictly 
national to becoming more international continued, and a series of meetings and reports in 
1998 led to the launch of the Financial Service Action Plan (FSAP) in 1999, which included 
the Basel II accord (Haan et al., 2009:50-55). 
The ISBs’ responses to the altering external pressures in the 1990s 
Despite the turbulent environment during the Swedish financial crisis, there was a 
general consensus among the respondents that they managed the crisis relatively well. The 
main explanation provided was their limited exposure to the speculative nature of the markets 
in the larger cities. At the same time, the booming years of the 1980s were over and the cost 
consciousness discussed earlier was entering the banks. In USB there was a change of CFO in 
1990 and during his first years in the bank much effort was put into developing and 
implementing monthly financial statements. The CFO of USB commented the first years of 
the 1990s in the following way: ‘during the 1980s we only had a yearly financial statement 
and by the end of the year we did not know what to expect; we did not know whether we had 
made enough money or not. As the uncertainty increased during the years of the crisis we felt 
that we needed to get a better understanding of our costs and our income’. 
The cost consciousness seems to have been part of a greater change within the savings 
banks. Before the crisis they had focused almost exclusively on growth, but in the early 1990s 
profitability became an equally important target. To become profitable the banks needed to 
know, at a more detailed level, where the costs and the income originated from. Initiatives 
such as keeping a monthly financial statement made the ISBs realize that almost all of their 
total income was stemming from the net interest income. As a result they started to charge 
customers for products and services that had previously been distributed for free. The 
profitability focus seems to have affected the way in which the interviewed ISBs 
conceptualized performance. Although respondents maintain that making money had always 
been a key objective, they also conclude that they improved considerably, during this period, 
in explaining both externally and internally why they need to make money. The change that 
occurred could be described as going from asking ‘how much money are we making?’ to 
‘how much money should we be making?’. 
An additional initiative during this period was the introduction of benchmarking. In the 
late 1980s the savings banks started working with benchmarking on a national level. 
Performance data was collected by the ISBA and distributed to the savings banks on a yearly 
basis. The respondents provide two main reasons, both related to interest rates, for the 
superiority of benchmarking over budgets. Firstly, since it is difficult to forecast interest rate 
fluctuations, and the savings banks’ result is highly dependent on interest rates, benchmarking 
is a better way of determine the banks’ performance. Secondly, interest rate accruals are 
difficult to establish without a support systems. In the early 1990s no such systems existed 
and therefore benchmarking became an important instrument to inform the savings banks of 
their performances and to learn from those banks that performed better. 
The crisis also seemed to have affected the banks’ perception of risk. Before the Swedish 
financial crisis, credit losses had remained low for a very long time-period. The huge credit 
losses made the banks aware of credit risks and how it could affect them, and new routines 
were developed to measure and price risk. As the technological development progressed, 
more advanced information systems to measure and price risk (e.g. credit scoring) and to 
calculate profitability on each individual customer were developed. A key issue discussed by 
several of the respondents was the need for support systems and a proper understanding of 
risk among the employees. The savings banks acknowledge that being ‘a relationship bank’, 
as the CEO of both ASB and SSB puts it, makes monitoring more important because ‘as 
humans we tend to be overconfident in our customers, especially when we have developed a 
relationship, and then it is good to have a system to support our decisions. However, it is 
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important that we maintain our human side so if the system indicates that the deal might be 
bad but the employee can justify it in the next level of the credit line, we might still proceed 
with the credit’ (CFO, USB). 
After the deregulations, the savings banks gradually started transforming from being 
transactional banks to becoming more sales-oriented organizations. As discussed above this 
development placed greater demands on the training and development of employees but it 
also affected the public’s perception of banks. The CEO of ASB expressed it as: ‘In the past 
our customers came to the bank with their caps in hand but today it is rather with a helmet on 
their heads’. The turbulent times after the financial crises in the 1990s (and today) have 
contributed to the deteriorated public view of bankers: ‘It used to be considered a respectable 
job to work in a bank but today, if one of our employees goes to a party, I believe that many of 
them would avoid mentioning that they are working in a bank’ (CEO, ASB).  
For USB the turn of the century also meant the start of a period where several of the 
employees were retiring. The change in personnel started with a new CEO in 2000 as the 
previous CEO was retiring. The new CEO had a history of working for Swedbank and 
brought with him ideas about how to make USB more efficient. This was done partly by 
allowing for a more decentralized responsibility and partly through gradually reducing the 
number of employees. The CEO also introduced a balanced scorecard in the organization with 
KPIs ranging from customer and employee satisfaction to risk adjusted return on capital 
(RAROC). In addition, USB experimented with a trainee program in which two individuals 
were hired to rotate between the various departments in the bank during one year. Today these 
two employees belong to the management team, but the bank has not continued with the 
trainee program primarily because it was part of the replacement strategy and USB did not 
feel the need to provide all new employees with such a comprehensive training. 
In sum, the crisis and the developments within the EU again altered the institutional 
pressures for the savings banks. Simply growth was no longer a sustainable strategic direction 
and in response the savings banks started focusing more on efficiency and sales. The financial 
crisis and the increasing competition had some major implications for the PMSs of the 
savings banks. Firstly, in order to become more efficient they needed a more detailed 
understanding of their costs and income. Thus, new operating systems and procedures (e.g. 
monthly financial statements) were established and the pricing mechanism was changed. 
Secondly, after the crisis the savings banks could no longer ignore credit risk, providing for 
new procedures towards risk measurement and a gradual shift in the organizational cultures 
towards a more conscious risk-taking. Finally, the competitive pressure that was developing 
after the crisis created a need for the savings banks to become more sales-oriented, which not 
only affected the training and development within the banks but also the recruitment process. 
A new type of banker was needed who could endure the downgraded public perception of 
bankers in general and, who was also more sales-oriented as an individual. 
5.3 Altering external pressures in the 2000s 
The burst of the IT bubble in the early 2000s caused huge losses on the stock market and 
forced many of the newly started companies within the IT sector to file for bankruptcy. The 
bubble primarily affected the IT, biotechnology and telecommunications industries (e.g. 
Waldron & Jordan, 2010) and the savings banks experienced limited impact by this event. 
However, the IT bubble and corporate scandals such as Enron accentuated the new regulatory 
regime that emerged during the early 2000s (e.g. Mikes, 2011), which greatly affected the 
Swedish savings banks (Olsson, 2009). 
As mentioned above, the FSAP included the Basel II accord. Basel I had in principle 
been criticized since its introduction, via its amendment in 1998, to its replacement with Basel 
II, which was released in 2004 and implemented in the beginning of 2007 (Blundell-Wignall 
& Atkinsson, 2010). Based on interviews conducted in 2005, Wahlström (2009) reports a 
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general consensus, among the largest banks in Sweden, that the implementation costs of Basel 
II would create big problems for the smaller banks. This is confirmed by Olsson (2009) who 
concludes that the new regulations were a major reason for the renewed consolidation phase 
initiated in 2005. From 2005 to 2010 the number of savings banks decreased from 78 to 63 
(Internal Performance Report, 2005; 2010) primarily through mergers between some of the 
smallest savings banks into larger banks with the financial strength to fulfill the new 
regulatory requirements (Olsson, 2009). In addition, new rules for employee training and 
development were introduced by the FSA in 2004. These rules placed tougher demands on the 
documentation and routines in relation to financial advice and meant a sharpening of the 
competence requirements of financial advisors (FFFS 2004:4). 
The recent financial crisis has been traced back to August 2007 but the 2008 bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers investment bank was the trigger of the world-wide financial crisis 
(Caprio & Honohan, 2010). Swedish banks exited the crisis relatively well in comparison to 
banks in many other countries, but the Swedish Government still had to take action and in 
February 2009 they decided to allocate SEK50 bn for bank recapitalization (Goddard et al., 
2009). In addition, three Swedish banks have lost their bank charters and three out of the four 
largest commercial banks issued new equity to absorb the anticipated credit losses. According 
to Lindblom et al. (2011) the financial crisis had a strong negative effect on the financial 
performance of Swedish savings banks primarily due to ownership engagements in 
Swedbank. 
Finally, in response to the crisis, the Basel Committee developed additional regulatory 
measures directed towards the financial industry. Sweden has accepted the Basel III 
framework with the implementation starting in 2013 and finalized by 2019. The framework 
includes an increase of the capital requirements from eight to at least nine and a half percent, 
a gross debt-equity ratio, two quantitative liquidity measures and stricter rules for the 
reporting of liquidity risk (Ingves, 2011). 
The ISBs’ responses to the altering external pressures in the 2000s 
The performance of savings banks is a rather vague concept. Starting in the mid-2000 the 
ISBs began a reconceptualization of their main objectives. These discussions have been 
analyzed by Silver (2007) and Olsson (2009). Both authors conclude that the ISBs have 
moved away from the somewhat fuzzy objective of promoting thrift to focus more specifically 
on activities that generate growth and customer value in the local region. This development 
was a recurring theme in the interviews and the respondents kept emphasizing that: ‘it is 
difficult to find the right projects to invest our money in because we are keen to find projects 
that generate growth and could be widely shared by the local community’ (CFO, USB). In 
addition, the sponsoring activities should enforce the picture of the ISB as a local player, thus 
favoring the bank: ‘when the savings bank foundation invests money in a local project it 
should also come back as marketing for the bank’ (CEO, SSB). 
In the new millennium the savings banks seem to have moved further away from growth 
focusing primarily on profitability and sales. The main reason is said to be the large market 
shares that they already have in the local markets, making continued growth difficult to 
accomplish. The move away from growth is also exemplified by the removing of KPIs 
focusing on growth. Today the KPIs primarily include sales indicators (e.g. number of 
customers meetings per employee) and efficiency indicators (e.g. the cost income ratio prior 
to provisions and net profit after provisions divided by the number of employees). Moreover, 
in 2001/2002 the saving banks decided to update the benchmarking report, which had 
previously contained information primarily from the balance sheet and income statement. The 
new report was gradually improved and today 32 savings banks get monthly information 
about their relative position based on KPIs within four categories; profitability, risk, sales, and 
customer satisfaction. 
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Throughout the deregulations’ first quarter of a century, the interviewed savings banks 
appear to have maintained lean and flat organizational structures. A large responsibility is 
delegated to the branches and according to the CEO of ASB, approximately 90 percent of the 
credit decisions should be dealt with at branch level. Even when the decisions cannot be made 
at the branch level, the time to reach a decision is generally very short. This is expressed by 
the credit manager of ASB: ‘The physical distance is very short meaning that we can keep the 
decision making process short even in larger decisions, often within the same day. In 
particular when dealing with large business customers we have a credit capacity which is 
between five and ten times the local branch of our competitors, thus a decision that might take 
three weeks to handle, in a large bank, can be handled by us within a couple of days’. 
The Basel II framework has affected the organizational structures of the savings banks, 
compelling them to add formal functions for compliance and internal auditing. There seem to 
be a general consensus among the respondents that the Basel accords take limited account of 
the smaller players on the banking market. However, according to the CEO of OSB, the Basel 
II framework also has a positive side: ‘although it has been tough, it has been helpful to 
actually write down our risk procedures on a piece of paper’. An important reason why many 
savings banks have managed to survive is their co-operation with Swedbank. Swedbank 
provides them with access to a wide range of products and services including information 
systems and a diversified product portfolio. Still, respondents are concerned about that they 
sometimes pay for systems that are more advanced than what they need and this notion 
becomes apparent when discussing how Basel II has affected the operating systems and 
procedures: ‘When reporting to the FSA the bank uses the simplified approach but since 
Swedbank apply the advanced internal approach the system calculates our capital 
requirements based on the latter’ (CEO, ASB). 
The training and development of employees have also been affected by the new 
regulatory features for financial advisors. Respondents withhold that the co-operation with 
Swedbank has played an important role for the savings banks’ ability to adapt to this new 
situation: ‘in connection with the new rules from the FSA we have defined new professional 
roles and we have chosen to strictly follow the roles defined by Swedbank to make sure that 
we are aligned with the expectations of the regulators’ (CEO, ASB). Still, it is important for 
the ISBs to maintain their autonomy and both time and effort is devoted to discussions 
concerning how the individual savings bank can add a local touch to the training sessions 
supplied by Swedbank. 
In sum, the technological development and the IT bubble, corporate scandals and a 
world-wide financial crisis during the past decade have played an important role in yet 
another reshaping of the institutional pressures exerted on the Swedish savings banks. The 
regulatory reformation is still ongoing and the continuous adaptation of the PMSs, described 
above, could possibly be understood in relation to the ISBs’ need for legitimacy on the 
modern banking market. 
6. Discussion 
Institutional theory predicts that firms will adapt to altering institutional pressures caused 
by changes in the external environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008). In addition, 
Oliver (1991) suggests that the responses can differ depending on how receptive the 
organization is to change and to what extent the altered institutional pressure conforms to the 
present state of the organization. 
During the 1980s the macro-level environment for Swedish banks changed radically. 
Socio-cultural and political factors promoting competition, free markets, and regulatory 
liberalization greatly affected the institutional pressures exerted on the ISBs. Not only did the 
37 
 
regulatory pressure decrease but uncertainty also increased drastically as the banks could no 
longer rely on the Riksbank to price interest rates. However, neither the larger savings banks 
nor the ISBs seem to have made any great changes to their PMSs in response to the altering 
external pressures during the 1980s. The larger savings banks responded to the deregulations 
by pursuing growth strategies, competing fiercely with the commercial banks by reducing 
interest rate margins and ignoring profitability. Nevertheless, ISBs in more rural areas did not 
fall into this mimic behavior to the same extent. The major explanation seems to reside in 
their reliance on the traditional church tower principle. The ISB bankers were familiar with 
their customers and could make a ‘sensible’ valuation of the individual securities. One 
interpretation of this behavior is that the banks took an active response to dismiss the norms 
and values of the banking market at that time. However, a more plausible explanation is that 
banks located at some distance from the larger cities were insulated from the new institutional 
pressures and instead followed the taken-for-granted norms that had traditionally existed in 
the ISBs. 
The next large change in the macro-economic environment of the ISBs was the Swedish 
financial crisis. The crisis affected the institutional pressures in several ways. The coercive 
pressures increased with the forming of Swedbank, the character of uncertainty was altered 
from boom to bust in a matter of months, and the publics’ perception of banks deteriorated. 
The crisis brought the previously expected cost consciousness back on the agenda and the 
savings banks group was changed completely. Much of the PMSs that are still in use in the 
ISBs, including the benchmarking practices, were built up during and after the financial crisis. 
Profitability and risk became important additions to the strategic directions and the ISBs 
started to move away from being transactional banks focusing on private customers to more 
sales-oriented organizations with diversified customer segmentation strategies. The ISBs 
worked hard on transforming their organizational cultures to promote safe and sound banks 
with the main purpose of making money to ensure the survival of the individual savings bank. 
In order to support a more sales-oriented approach training and development of employees 
became important and much effort was directed to internal training programs. The strategic 
response to the institutional pressures during this period seems to have been close to what 
Oliver (1991:152) describes as ‘comply’ i.e. accepting the norms that were developing. 
The third shift in the macro-economic environment was triggered by a series of corporate 
scandals and the bursting of the IT-bubble in the early 2000s. The efficient working of 
markets, particularly in the banking industry has become increasingly questioned, which 
culminated with the financial crisis that started in 2007. This shift has resulted in a gradual re-
regulation of the banking industry, and the new regulatory regime expressed by the Basel 
accords and the framework covering financial advisors have great implications for the ISBs. 
Firstly, some of the ISBs, which could not support the more centralized organizational 
structure enforced by the regulators, have had to merge. In addition, those ISBs that have not 
merged seem to become more dependent on their relationship with Swedbank. Thus, the 
decoupling between the risk procedures used by the ISBs (the advanced internal approach), 
and those reported to the FSA (the simplified approach) shows how the ISBs are trying to 
simultaneously respond to coercive pressures from regulators and from Swedbank. Referring 
again to Oliver’s (1991:154) typology it would indicate that the savings banks are using 
concealment tactics i.e. disguising non-conformity behind a façade of acquiescence. However, 
based on findings of this study, it does not seem like a deliberate strategy to avoid the new 
regulations. It rather appears as if the ISBs have passively adopted the intrinsic procedures of 
the information system provided by their main supplier and simultaneously are trying to obey 
the rules of the regulators. 
External pressures are commonly described as particularly important factors of change 
for banks, not least in view of their distinctive role in society (e.g. Helliar et al., 2002). 
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However, as discussed earlier, the unique governance structure of savings banks gives the 
managers a strong position (Crespí et al., 2004; Silver, 2007; Olsson, 2009) and the findings 
of this study confirms similar findings among Swedish ISBs in relation to PMS’s change. The 
small size and the absence of strong owners provide an excellent environment for managers at 
key positions to influence the PMSs. In USB the changing of CFO in the early 1990s 
provided for the use of monthly financial statements and thus a better understanding and 
control of the bank’s costs and income. Similarly, the new CEO in USB introduced, among 
other things, a more decentralized responsibility and a balanced scorecard. Although the 
changing of CEO in ASB is rather recent, a new measurement system has already been 
introduced.  
7. Conclusion 
The first aim of this study is to investigate how the Swedish savings banks have adapted 
their PMSs to altering external pressures over the deregulations’ first quarter of a century. It 
has been shown here that the ISBs have transformed their PMSs from a bare minimum to 
consideration of a wide range of activities. These include strategies focusing on profitability, 
sales and customer diversifications; organizational cultures promoting the ability to make 
money and prudent risk-taking; lean and flat organizational structures; sophisticated 
information systems and benchmarking practices; and extensive training and development. 
Still, the number of ISBs has been reduced from almost 150 to 58 over this period, and 
whether this trend will continue remains to be seen. According to the PMSs literature, 
organizations should align their key objectives with the PMSs design (e.g. Chenhall, 2003; 
Adler, 2011). The findings of this paper indicate that those ISBs that have remained 
independent, have succeeded in adapting their PMSs to the changing external environment, 
which provides some reasons to believe that the ISBs will continue to be an important factor 
on the Swedish banking market. 
The second aim of this study is to explore why the adaption of the PMSs has occurred. 
Several external factors have been observed here as drivers of PMS’s change in ISBs such as 
the Swedish financial crisis, the technological development, and the new risk regime. 
However, different from what we could expect, based on the predictions of institutional 
theory, the deregulations seem to have had a limited direct effect on the PMSs. Only after the 
Swedish financial crisis did the savings banks start adopting their PMSs to the new 
institutional pressures. This observation is interesting in relation to the new regulatory regime, 
which was triggered by misbehaving organizations in other countries and implemented by 
international regulators. The ISBs have only just begun their adaption to the new regulatory 
regime, but why increase the regulatory pressure on banks that already behave? This question 
begs for continued research but the reducing number of savings banks, and the decoupling 
between the new regulatory framework and the risk practices used by the savings banks, could 
be a signal to policy-makers that small local banks may need a different regulatory 
framework. 
Finally, the broad theme and longitudinal nature of this study contributes to our 
understanding of PMS’s change in the ISBs. At the same time, the study naturally becomes 
‘thin’ in terms of accounting for the complex every-day practices and routines within the 
banks. The framework used here focus primarily on the effects of the external environment 
but the findings indicate that internal factors may be equally important to explain PMS’s 
change in banks. Therefore, a more comprehensive framework that includes both external and 
internal factors could provide a more fine-grained understanding of the rationale behind 
PMSs’ change in banks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The cross-national deregulation of the banking industry, in the 1980s, was argued to 
provide for the efficient working of markets through self-regulation (Cerny, 1991; Vipond, 
1991). Among other things the deregulation would provide incentives for banks to develop 
more sophisticated management accounting and control instruments (Bergendahl, 1989) and 
research shows that banks have adopted a wide variety of such instruments including: activity 
based cost management (Innes & Mitchell, 1997; Helliar et al., 2002; Soin et al., 2002; Norris, 
2002; Vieira & Hoskins; 2005), the balanced scorecard (Ittner et al 2003; van der Steen, 2011) 
and various benchmarking activities (Cobb et al., 1995; Helliar et al., 2002; Hussain, 2003; 2005; 
Adler, 2011).Yet, in the past decades the world of banking has witnessed a series of corporate 
failures (like Barings Bank and Lehman Brothers), large-scale one-off losses (like the Allied 
Irish Bank in 2002 and Société Général in 2008), regional systemic crises (like the Nordic 
bank crisis in the early 1990s and the Asian bank crisis of 1996) and most recently the large 
scale global systemic financial crisis (Mikes, 2011:226). These events have made critics argue 
for a re-regulation of the financial service industry aiming at reducing the risk of bank failures 
(Barth & Landsman, 2010) and several regulatory initiatives such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
in the US and the Capital Requirements Directives enforcing the Basel accords in Europe 
have been taken (Power, 2004; Mikes, 2011). With most countries still suffering from the 
world-wide financial, and economic, crisis the question of how to reform existing institutions 
has assumed greater urgency (Battilana et al., 2009:66) but despite of the tremendous change 
that the banking industry has gone through over the past three decades (Bátiz-Lazo & Wood, 
2003; Goddard et al., 2007; Wilson et al., 2010; Larson et al., 2011), we still know little about 
how bank managers respond to external pressures of change, and how those responses affect 
the banks’ performance management systems1 (Seal & Croft, 1997; Helliar et al., 2002; Soin 
& Scheytt, 2009; Munir et al., 2011). 
The present work is a case study of the Swedish banking industry from the deregulations 
in the 1980s until today. Using an institutional entrepreneurship framework (Greenwood et 
al., 2002; Munir, 2005; Battilana, 2009; Arroyo, 2012), the aim is to study how the 
performance management systems (PMSs) of large Swedish banks have been adapted to the 
ongoing transformation of the banking industry, and the reasons behind the adoption. In order 
to cover such a wide and extensive theme, Sweden offers an excellent research environment. 
Firstly, Sweden is a small and open economy which banking industry has followed the 
general European trend of deregulation, internationalization and consolidation (e.g. Larsson, 
1998; Wilson et al., 2010). Secondly, the Swedish banking industry consists of a limited 
number of players
2
 making it feasible for conducting explorative studies on a field-level basis. 
Thirdly, throughout the recent financial crisis, Swedish banks have managed well, compared 
                                                 
1
 Drawing primarily on Ferreira & Otley (2009) and Adler (2011), performance management systems are defined 
as all the tools managers use in implementing the main objectives of the organization. The definition includes 
both tools used to control employees (management control systems) and information used for decision support 
(management accounting systems). According to Adler (2011) the four control mechanisms used for 
implementing the main objectives are: organizational structure, organizational culture, operating systems and 
procedures, and training and development 
2
 In December 2010 there were a total of 114 banks in Sweden. 
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to their peers, and could offer interesting insights of how successful banks have coped with 
the ongoing transformation. Finally, Swedish bankers have a long tradition of staying within 
the same bank, thereby providing access to expert respondents which can account as 
witnesses of the developments over time. 
Thus, this article addresses the question of how different types of external pressures are 
interpreted and integrated into the PMSs of organizations. Although limited in terms of 
generalizability, the results of this study highlight some fundamental aspects of the PMS’s 
change process, which may be of relevance to other settings. The institutional 
entrepreneurship framework allows us to move between different levels of analysis and 
illustrate the dynamics of how organizations, which experience continues, but altering 
pressures of change, are involved in a seemingly endless process of theorizing (Munir, 2005). 
The manner, in which PMS’s change was expressed throughout this theorizing process, relied 
extensively on the nature of the external pressures and how top management interpreted these 
pressures and integrated them into the PMSs. The deregulations in the mid-1980s created a 
growing pressure on banks to improve their performance, and one reasonable response would 
have been for the banks to either improve the existing PMSs or introduce new systems 
(Hussain & Hoque, 2002; Munir et al., 2011). Still, even though the deregulations led to a 
deinstitutionalization of the existing PMSs in the Swedish banks, they were not replaced by 
new innovations but instead by a set of practices that ignored the existing rules and routines. 
Similarly, the new regulatory regime during the 2000s seems, so far, only to have reinforced 
an ongoing transformation of the PMSs, but major direct effects to the PMSs are absent. To 
the contrary, the Swedish financial crisis in the early 1990s resulted in a complete change in 
the PMSs of the banks and the theorization process that followed the crisis facilitated the 
integration and institutionalization of these new innovations.  
The analysis is developed in the remainder of this paper, which is organized as follows. 
In the next section I introduce the theoretical framework, and motivate the usefulness of the 
framework in explaining PMS’s change. I then go on to describe the method used in this 
paper, after which the case study will follow. Finally, I discuss the findings and provide some 
concluding remarks. 
THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
Institutional Entrepreneurship 
There have been an extensive number of studies of management accounting change
3
 
during the last decade (e.g. Busco et al., 2007). Two commonly used theoretical frameworks 
to analyze the different aspects of management accounting change are Old Institutional 
Economics (OIE) and New Institutional Sociology (NIS) (see e.g. Moll et al., 2006 for a 
discussion about different streams of institutional theorizing). OIE has primarily been utilized 
                                                 
3
 The way in which managers seek to control employees and collect information for decision support purposes 
has received various definitions and conceptualizations including: management accounting, management control 
systems, management accounting systems, and management accounting control systems (e.g. Chenhall & 
Langfield-Smith, 1998; Chenhall, 2003; Malmi & Brown, 2008). Recently scholars have emphasized the 
problem of separating management accounting techniques from other features of the performance management 
system since these are commonly interdependent (e.g. Otley, 1999; Malmi & Brown, 2008; Ferreira & Otley, 
2009; Adler, 2011). In addition, it has been argued that this separation expands the gap between research and 
practice (e.g. Nixon & Burns, 2005:265; Berry et al., 2009) since they are not treated separately in practice. For 
those reasons a broader and more practice-oriented approach to study performance management systems have 
been suggested and this paper will adopt such a framework. However, as much of the change literature have 
relied on the term management accounting, when conceptualizing change in the control mechanisms, I will refer 
to both concepts interchangeably throughout the theory section.    
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to explain the change process itself but offers limited help in addressing the role of external 
pressures, i.e. the social, political and economic issues that influence the organizational 
context in this process. NIS has proven useful in explaining why organizational practices 
diffuse, but does not consider how those practices evolve within adopting organizations 
(Arroyo, 2012:3-5). A few recent studies have tried to combine OIE and NIS (see e.g. Ribeiro 
& Scapens, 2006), but according to Arroyo (2012) the combinational approach still 
underestimates the role of agency in the change process. To overcome this problem she 
introduces an institutional entrepreneurship (IE) framework to the study of management 
accounting change.  
IE stems from the study of organizations, and was first introduced by DiMaggio (1988), 
with the purpose of bringing back the role of agency into institutional theory. The main idea 
was to develop a framework that could explain how actors can shape institutions while 
simultaneously being constrained by them (Leca et al., 2006:2). Within IE theorizing, the 
institutional entrepreneur is an actor who leverages resources to create new, or transform 
existing, institutions (Battilana et al., 2009:68, see also DiMaggio, 1988; Garud et al., 2007). 
Institutional entrepreneurs can be either individuals, or organizations, with different 
motivations (e.g. values, ideology, power or problems to be solved), which makes them either 
intentionally or unintentionally challenge the current institutions (Leca et al., 2006). The 
institutional entrepreneurs draw on these motivations to develop visions, mobilize people and 
motivate others (Battilana et al., 2009). In addition, the institutional entrepreneur may pursue 
goals at different levels of analysis. When acting at the field level, they may strive to change 
the current institutions e.g. norms or regulations. On an organizational level the goal may be 
to change organizational practices; and at the individual level they may seek to realize or 
enhance their own interests and values. Still, not all change agents are institutional 
entrepreneurs but only those who both initiate change, and actively participate in the 
implementation (Battilana et al., 2009; Arroyo, 2012). 
Since its introduction, the literature on IE has grown exponentially (Battilana et al., 
2009), and the framework offers two main advantageous in the study of PMS’s change. As 
discussed above, the IE framework gives a pivotal role to agency, thus, allowing for 
elaborations on the endogenous factors of change. Still, IE does not refrain from the fact that 
exogenous factors may be equally important in explaining change, and thereby the IE 
framework bridge OIE and NIS by countenancing the researcher to move between different 
levels of analysis (Arroyo, 2012). In order to clarify how change processes can be understood 
and combined, at different levels of analysis; the next section illustrates the conceptual 
framework used to inform the investigation and the interpretation of data. 
Organizational Fields and Institutional Change 
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) defined an organizational field as ’sets of organizations that, 
in the aggregate, constitute an area of institutional life; key suppliers, resource and product 
consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or 
products.’ (148-149). Scott (1995; 2008) adds to this definition by emphasizing that fields 
partake in a common meaning system, which makes them interact more frequently with each 
other than with those outside the field. Moreover, a field is not a static thing but it is under 
constant evolution (Hoffman, 1999) and therefore, what constitutes a field will be open to 
debate, both by those who belong to the field and those standing outside (Dorado, 2005). 
Following Greenwood et al (2002), the process of institutional change, at the field level, 
consists of six stages. The first stage begins with a precipitating jolt i.e. a social upheaval, 
technological disruptions, competitive discontinuities, or regulatory change. In the second 
stage, new players enter the field, old players leave, and the deinstitutionalization of old 
practices begins. During this second stage of the change process, institutional entrepreneurs 
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may disturb the current socially constructed consensus by introducing new ideas, which tend 
to start as independent innovations to locally perceived problems in the pre-
institutionalization phase (stage III). In order to gain legitimacy the ideas are theorized (stage 
IV), first, through a specification of the problem, and then, through a justification of the 
possible solution. As the ideas are objectified and packaged into more pragmatic forms, in 
which the functional superiority will be stressed to confer legitimacy, they may diffuse (stage 
V). Finally, as the new innovations become re-institutionalized (stage VI), i.e. taken-for-
granted, the innovations gain cognitive legitimacy and become socially accepted within the 
field. 
Although the sequential model described above has become accepted, and commonly 
used in the literature, it has also been subject to critique. For example, Munir (2005:94) 
asserts that by attributing institutional change to jolts, the model moves away from the social 
constructivist roots of institutional theory. Instead, Munir suggests that it is theorization which 
makes a jolt disruptive. Rather than just being a stage in the process, theorization spans the 
entire process. By stressing the role of theorization, in the process of institutional change, 
agency becomes essential because jolts need sponsors, and these sponsors are often 
institutional entrepreneurs searching for jolts to bring about institutional change (Munir, 
2005:107). As will be elaborated on below, the PMSs may be subject to change in several of 
the stages in the process of institutional change. 
Performance Management Systems and Change 
The understanding of jolts as possible, but not necessary, triggers of change provides for 
the conceptualization of PMS’s change as part of a negotiation process in which institutional 
entrepreneurs impart meaning to jolts by, for instance, pointing at faults in the existing PMSs 
(Munir, 2005; Arroyo, 2012). In the negotiation process, stakeholders exert pressures on 
organizations, which could result in a reformulation of the main objectives, and once the main 
objectives are defined they may shape the main control practices (Simons, 1995; Chenhall, 
2003; Adler, 2011; Arroyo, 2012). According to Oliver (1991), organizational responses may 
differ depending on the strength of the pressures exerted on them, and how congruent these 
pressures are with the organizations current objectives, but ‘an organization’s responses to 
the institutional environment will not only influence organizational performance, they may 
also influence the criteria, measures, or standards used by institutional constituents to 
evaluate performance’ (1991:174). This line of reasoning brings us close the suggestions 
made by Burns & Scapens (2000:5) that ‘management accounting practice can both shape 
and be shaped by the institutions that govern organizational activity’. They emphasize, that 
for new management accounting practices to become institutionalized the organizational 
actors must encode, enact, and reproduce them. Still, the authors give little guidance on how 
organizational actors follow those processes and, therefore, Arroyo (2012) introduces the 
concepts of interpretation and integration. The former relates to ‘the process of explaining, 
through words and/or actions,… an insight to one’s self and to others’ (Crossan et al., 
1999:525 in Lawrence et al., 2005:185). The latter concerns how the idea is integrated among 
managers to form a common understanding of the concept through mutual adjustment and 
coordinated action (Lawrence et al., 2005; Arroyo, 2012). After the new idea has been 
interpreted and integrated, it is presented for the organizational actors to encode, enact and 
reproduce. In order for the new practice to become institutionalized, at the field level, it must 
also diffuse, be reproduced, and become highly accepted by other organizations. 
The main elements of Arroyos (2012) model are illustrated in Figure 1. The model draws 
largely on the conceptualization of institutional change suggested by Greenwood et al (2002) 
and the process of institutionalization proposed by Burns & Scapens (2000). The theory 
suggests to initially focus on the process at the field level, and then to evolve the examination 
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to the organizational and individual level. Thus, each part of the findings starts by identifying 
and describing the precipitating jolt, and the field-level theorizing process. I will then identify 
adaptions in the banks’ PMSs and describe the processes of interpretation and integration, 
within the investigated banks, in relation to a precipitating jolt. Although I will not be able to 
study, closely, the processes of encoding, enactment, and reproduction I may be able to say 
something about the diffusion of PMS’s practices at the field level. Before proceeding with 
the findings I will describe the research approach in the next section. 
 
 
METHODS 
Site 
The field of interest here is the Swedish banking industry which includes professional 
associations (e.g. the Swedish Bankers Association), regulatory bodies (e.g. the Basel 
Committee, the Swedish FSA, and The Riksbank), and the banks, which is the primary 
concern of this article. As mentioned above a field is not a static thing but under constant 
evolution, and different constituents have played key roles at different periods. It has been the 
intention here to illustrate the evolution of the Swedish banking industry and its PMSs, but 
research is concerned with making trade-offs (e.g. Weick, 1995), and this paper are concerned 
with such restrictions in at least two ways. First, the study will primarily focus on the large 
commercial banks in Sweden, partly because these players have existed (in some form) 
throughout the whole period of investigation, and partly because they have consistently held a 
market share of about 80 percent of the Swedish banking market. Second, as in any case work 
the empirical material is vast and many variables may appear crucial, yet theory is only 
helpful if it can rise above the idiosyncratic case and, therefore, one need to make choices 
(Siggelkow, 2007:21). The focus on the processes of interpretation and integration in relation 
Figure 2. An institutional entrepreneurship framework to PMS’s change 
Source: Arroyo, 2012:295 
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to a precipitating jolt is the result of such a choice, motivated by the critical dialogue ‘in the 
interplay among theory, researcher subjectivity, and empirical material’ (Alvesson & 
Kärreman, 2007:1266) as further discussed in the data analysis.  
The Swedish Banks 
Over the past three decades the structure of the Swedish banking industry has changed 
considerably and Table 1 below shows the number of banks within each segment over this 
period. In December 2010 there were a total of 114 banks in Sweden; 19 commercial banks, 
29 foreign banks, 64 savings banks out of which 14 have converted to joint stock banks, and 
two cooperative banks. Five large banks accounted for more than 80 per cent of deposits and 
lending in Sweden. From the table we can observe that the number of banks remained stable 
throughout the 1980s (apart from a gradual reduction in the number of mutual
4
 banks). In 
1986, the regulations forbidding foreign banks to operate on the Swedish banking market 
were abolished but the influence of the foreign players remained limited throughout the 1980s 
(Larsson, 1998). In the early 1990s Sweden was hit by a severe financial crisis and as can be 
seen below the number of banks decreased drastically, but as the economic conditions 
stabilized the banks started to increase gradually, reaching its peak in 2007. With the new 
regulations (e.g. Basel II) a number of the smallest savings banks have merged to survive the 
increasing administrative burden, thus accounting for the decrease of banks during recent 
years (Olsson, 2009). 
Table 2. Banks in Sweden from 1980 to 2010 
Type of Bank 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Swedish Commercial Banks 14 14 14 14 9 14 15 25 26 28 33 
- Large Banks 3 3 3 3 6 5 4 4 4 4 4 
- Converted Savings Banks 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 11 12 11 14 
- Niche Banks 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 8 10 13 15 
- Other Banks 11 11 11 11 3 3 2 2 0 0 0 
Foreign Banks 0 0 12 10 6 11 17 21 22 31 29 
- Subsidiaries 0 0 12 10 5 0 2 2 3 4 3 
- Branches 0 0 0 0 1 11 15 19 19 27 26 
Savings Banks 164 154 119 109 91 90 85 77 76 65 50 
Co-operative Banks 420 395 389 383 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 
Total 598 563 534 516 106 115 117 125 126 126 114 
 
Source: Data received from The Swedish Bankers Association 
Data Sources 
The article relies on data from multiple sources including; archival data (annual reports, 
internal documents and news-paper articles), previous literature (academic articles, books, 
autobiographies and historical accounts), statistical data, and interviews. 
Initially the annual reports of the four largest banks in Sweden from 1985 to 2010 
together with a booklet (named “The Banks”), published by Statistics Sweden, from 1980-
2003 were read in order to create a basic understanding of the field and a chronology of 
events. These reports were used to create a database of the key performance ratios reported by 
the banks over the complete time-period. The annual reports offer a systematic, easily 
accessed and yearly published document, which, even though regulations have changed, keep 
a similar structure throughout the full period. However, the link between the annual reports 
and the actual PMSs practices have been contested (e.g. Ax & Marton, 2008) and therefore 
additional data was acquired through interviews, and internal documentation received by 
respondents. 
                                                 
4 Mutual banks include savings banks and member banks 
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The process of selecting respondents was guided by two main criteria. First, the 
respondents should have a long experience of the banking industry; preferably more than 20 
years. Second, since the study moves across different levels of analysis the respondents 
should be part of, or have been part of, the top management team in the bank. The 
respondents were identified through the reading of relevant books, biographies, and historical 
accounts of the Swedish banking industry. In addition, the annual reports were a useful tool to 
identify potential respondents since the reports provide the tenure and position of key 
employees. Finally, advice on suitable respondents was received from both researchers and 
practitioners in the field. A list of potential respondents was prepared and each person was 
contacted individually. Some declined
5
 to be interviewed, some suggested alternative 
respondents and in some cases the respondent helped out in gaining access to additional 
respondents. This selection process is similar to the snowball sampling (e.g. Bryman & Bell, 
2007) and was used for two purposes. Firstly, it is difficult to estimate the full population of 
respondents only based on external information. Secondly, since the respondents primarily 
belong to the top management team of the largest financial institutions in Sweden, 
recommendations from others in the same group is helpful in order to get access to the 
appropriate respondents. 
Alvesson (2003) discusses three positions when using the interview as a research 
method: neopositivism, romanticism and localism. This paper follows the latter which, 
according to Qu & Dumay (2011:242) ‘…is based on understanding interviews in a social 
context, instead of treating it as a tool for collecting data in isolation’. The authors advocate 
the use of semi-structured interviews when adapting the localist position and they explain that 
‘[T]he semi-structured interview involves prepared questioning guided by identified themes in 
a consistent and systematic manner interposed with probes designed to elicit more elaborate 
responses’ (246). In this paper the interview guide has been highly informed by the 
performance management systems framework discussed above. The questions were divided 
into six categories: performance; strategy; organizational culture; organizational structure; 
operating systems and procedures; and training and development. All interviews were tape-
recorded and have been transcribed
6
, and field notes (including pictures at some sites) have 
been taken to improve procedural reliability (see Ryan et al., 2002, chapter 8).  
Finally, to gain a deeper understanding of the field-level change a large number of 
research papers, books, business press articles, and governmental reports have been studied. 
Here too a snowballing approach was used, and in some cases the author of the specific book 
or report was contacted in order to get comments and ideas for additional data collection. 
Data Analysis 
According to De Loo & Lowe (2012:6) reflexivity is commonly used in case-study 
research to tackle the more technical aspects of research i.e. the method. However, they argue 
that reflexivity should also play an important part in the data analysis phase. There are many 
ways in which reflexivity can be introduced into the data analysis, but De Loo & Lowe draw 
on Alvesson (2003) to show how the critical dialogue between data and theory can be 
analyzed and understood from different perspectives. The idea of keeping a critical dialogue 
between theory, researcher subjectivity, and empirical material is not uncommon in 
contemporary qualitative research, but according to Alvesson & Kärreman (2007:1266) 
striving for friction, rather than harmony, in this dialogue may provide equally valuable 
                                                 
5
 In two of the interviews access was negotiated by another researcher. These two interviews were held by the 
other researcher and with a different set of questions. Meetings were held prior to the interviews to inform the 
other researcher of the purpose and questions of this paper, and after the interviews to discuss the interviews. 
The interviews were transcribed by the author of this paper. 
6
 The responses quoted in this study have been translated from Swedish to English by the author.  
49 
 
contributions. This dialogue will be part of the researchers own theorizing process (Weick, 
1995) and may change during the research process. 
This study uses an unconstrained deductive content analysis to make sense of the 
empirical material i.e. previous research (the performance management systems framework) 
is used to define a broad set of categories. Within the bound of these categories, sub-
categories were developed based on an inductive approach (see Elo & Kyngäs, 2007 for an 
extended discussion of this method). The problem of this approach was that the analysis 
became too descriptive, and therefore a different framework was introduced to help analyze 
the data (i.e. the IE framework). The new framework helped explain several of the features in 
the change process and made the story of the paper more coherent. Thus, the initial analysis 
was guided by the idea of creating friction between the data and the theoretical framework, 
but the new framework instead provided for harmony. In addition, the new theoretical 
framework gave reason to extend the initial list of informants. In particular, organizational 
actors involved in, or closely related to, activities identified as subject to change (e.g. risk 
practices, international expansion), but who were not originally included because they were 
considered outside the scope of the study, were identified. The following two sections report 
and analyze the findings of the study. 
The Swedish banking industry from 1980 to 2010 
Deregulations - the start of the change process 
The decades after World War II were characterized by strict governmental control 
resulting in tougher regulations and increased state ownership within the Swedish financial 
sector. However, apart from gradually limiting the room for banks to own shares, until it was 
finally prohibited in 1934, only minor changes were made in the bank legislation until the 
early 1950s. During the 1950s the state introduced liquidity ratios, interest regulation, share 
issue control, stricter requirements for capital adequacy, and regulations limiting bank 
lending. All these regulations strengthened the Riksbank’s role as a central bank. At the same 
time competition was strongly depressed and the banking market developed into an oligopoly 
market
7
. To modernize the banking law and allow for greater competition the first 
deregulatory initiative was taken in 1968 allowing mutual banks to compete with commercial 
banks. During the 1970s the banks found ways to avoid the regulations and the 
internationalization of the money market made several features of the regulatory framework 
superfluous. The deregulation during the 1980s is summarized in Table 2 below (Larsson, 
1998:207): 
Table 3 Deregulatory initiatives 
Deregulatory initiative Year 
The share issue control was relieved 1983 
The interest rate regulation was abolished 1985 
The lending ceilings were lifted 1985 
The penal interest for credit agencies’ borrowing in the Riksbank was replaced by an interest 
depending on the amount of borrowing 
1985 
The credit agencies placement requirements were abolished 1986 
The currency control regulating capital transactions with foreign countries was gradually 
reduced until it was abolished and replaced by an emergency law 
1989 
 
                                                 
7 Readers interested in the history of Swedish banking may be referred to e.g. Glete, 1994; Larsson, 1998; 2011; 
and Broberg, 2006 
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Before the 1980s regulations were action oriented strictly limiting the banks’ acting 
space. Consequently operational procedures and information systems remained simple and 
banks could enjoy satisfactory profits largely without considerations of effectiveness and 
efficiency (Englund, 1999). Not only can the deregulations be seen as the starting-point for 
the transformation of the Swedish banking market, but as the central bank released its 
stranglehold on the financial market, profit margins started to decrease and the need for more 
sophisticated PMSs was expected to arose among the Swedish banks (Bergendahl, 1989). 
Deregulations and PMS’s change 
After the oil-crisis in 1974 Sweden struggled with high inflation and deteriorating 
governmental finance. Between 1973 and 1982 Sweden devaluated the currency six times and 
even though the devaluations caused the Krona to become temporarily undervalued, the 
appreciation continued, and the expectations of further devaluations provided for consistently 
high interest rates. When entering the second half of the 1980s, Sweden had experienced more 
than a decade of high inflation and together with consistently increasing prices on the 
property market, and a tax legislation that made it favorable to speculate on the property 
market, demand for credit was exceptionally high. Thus, when the credit ceiling was 
abolished, in November 1985, it was like opening the Pandora’s Box. Suddenly credit became 
a ubiquity, and in just a few years bank lending more than doubled, and the overall balance 
sheet size of the banking sector almost tripled (see Englund, 1999 for an excellent historical 
account). Before the deregulations, traditional banks had started to lose some of their business 
to other players on the market (e.g. the finance companies) and they argued strongly for 
deregulations, which, according to the banks, would allow for more equal competition. When 
the banks were no longer restricted by the regulations, they wanted to regain some of their 
market shares, and growth became the key objective of most banks. An interest war broke out 
in which the banks competed fiercely with each-other. Not surprisingly, extending credits to 
the real-estate sector was considered the most prominent way to achieve the ambitious growth 
targets. Traditionally, credit losses within the real-estate sector had remained at very low 
levels and historical data showed that property prices would continue to increase. It was not 
uncommon, during this period, to extend credits at more than 100 percent of the property 
value, i.e. accounting for a future increase in the value of the property. In retrospect, the 
careless extension of credits was not a sustainable path, but during a few years of the late 
1980s, the Swedish banks were among the most profitable banks in the world. Although most 
Swedish banks followed a similar path, the case of Gota Bank is illustrative for the 
developments on the banking market in the 1980s. In less than a decade, Gota Bank, or 
Götabanken as it was named back then, went from being a successful regional bank with roots 
dating back to the early 19
th
 century, to bankruptcy. 
The case of Gota Bank
8
 
In 1981/82 Götabanken, together with SIAR (Scandinavian Institute for Administrative 
Research), launched what was to become one of the first strategic development initiatives on 
the Swedish banking market. The strategy work resulted in a decision to no longer focus on 
all customer groups, but instead Götabanken selected two customer groups as the bank’s key 
segments: small and middle-sized firms; and wealthy individuals. An example of how 
Götabanken aimed to attract customers within these segments was the novel introduction of a 
                                                 
8
 This short description is based on an interview with a consultant that was involved in a change-project at 
Götabanken from 1982-1985. In addition, internal documentation related to the change project was received at 
the end of the interview. Finally, the case of Gota AB from 1985-1992 is carefully described in Petersson (2004). 
Petersson relies primarily on internal correspondence between the main actors of Gota AB and Proventus, and 
the focus of the report is governance during institutional and organizational change. 
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personal banker for customers with more than SEK 40,000
9
 in their savings account. In 
addition, the strategy work created a need for information systems that could provide 
customer and product profitability numbers. At this point the technological development of 
information systems had reached a level at which it was technologically possible to include 
more information than just the account data in the code snippet. A small Gothenburg-based 
consultancy firm was recruited to help out in the design of the new computerized system, 
which was going to be linked to the strategy. The new system was highly sophisticated in 
respect to the standards of that time and information about account, responsibility, product 
and customer was included in the code snippet. In addition to creating a system in which it 
was possible to measure profitability there was a problem of accounting for risk exposures. 
Previous to this project employees who took on large exposures to risk (e.g. by extending 
unsecured loans) were celebrated, as they brought new volumes to the bank. However, since 
credits with a high risk utilized a large part of the capital adequacy requirements a new 
internal price mechanism was developed, which took credit risk exposures into account. 
In 1985 an investment company named Proventus bought a major share in Götabanken, 
which at that time was the fifth largest bank in Sweden. Proventus applied strong and active 
governance, and in 1986 a new management team was appointed (Petersson, 2004). 
According to a consultant involved in the earlier reshaping of the bank, several of the 
employees were worried since the new management was dismantling the information system 
that they had developed: ‘I was approached by several people from Götabanken, which said 
that they [Proventus] were removing the risk-sharing mechanism in order to allow for a 
faster expansion’. 
Throughout the remainder of the 1980s Götabanken continued its expansion both by 
extending their credits and through M&As. In 1990, Götabanken merged with 
Wermlandsbanken and Skaraborgsbanken
10
 to form Gota Bank. In 1988 a new business 
strategy was developed in which the main target was to achieve a profit of SEK 2b in 1991. 
The idea was to generate this profit through a growth in lending to the real estate sector. In the 
early 1990s, credit losses started to increase and on the 16
th
 of September 1992 Gota AB, the 
owner of Gota Bank, suspended its payments and a few months later the Swedish Government 
bought the shares in Gota Bank from the bankrupt estate (Petersson, 2004). Gota Bank was 
later integrated into Nordbanken
11
, and according to the previous CEO of Nordea his first 
meeting with the employees of Gota Bank, after they had been taken over by Nordea, was 
dramatic because: ‘they had no idea about how bad the conditions of the bank was’. This 
illustrates how the organizational members had come to accept the new practices as the most 
viable way and how they were not susceptible to the extreme consequences of those practices.  
Similarly, it is interesting to note that in an article in the business press a few years after 
the bankruptcy, Gabriel Urwitz
12
 (1998:58-59) provided four major reasons for the failure of 
Gota Bank: (i) the absence of an information system that provided a thorough overview of the 
overall loan portfolio and its’ risk; (ii) an overly decentralized organization; (iii) a 
performance measurement system with too much emphasizes on return on equity; and (iv) the 
organizational members difficulties in handling the cultural change from operating under 
strict regulation to free market-orientation. 
The absence of PMSs rather than PMS’s change 
On the field level, new financial products were rapidly developed, and in just a few years 
the Swedish certificate market grew to become the fifth largest in the world (in absolute 
                                                 
9
 In today’s currency value that is equal to about SEK 100,000. 
10
 Proventus had bought major shares in Wermlandsbanken in 1986 and Skaraborgsbanken in 1988. 
11
 Nordbanken is now named Nordea and for simplicity Nordea will be used from this point on. 
12
 Former chairman of the board in Proventus and one of the main actors in Gota Bank between 1985 and 1992 
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terms), and Sweden became one of the few countries in the world with a domestic credit 
rating agency, Nordisk Rating (SOU 2000:11). In addition, innovations such as the ATM, 
telephone banking, and electronic information systems to handle transactions, quickly 
diffused among the banks (see e.g. Ems et al., 1993; Thodenius, 2008). Still, Table 3 shows 
that the Swedish banks continued to earn most of their income through the net interest 
income, and the carless risk-taking described both by respondents, and by earlier studies, 
indicate that innovation in terms of introducing new PMSs practices and routines was absent 
(Pettersson, 1993; Larsson & Sjöberg, 1998; Urwitz, 1998; Englund, 1999). Both intuitively, 
and based on the results of previous studies, the expected reaction to the deregulations would 
have been a change in the PMSs by the banks e.g. by introducing new cost accounting and 
profitability reporting routines (e.g. Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998; Euske & Riccaboni, 1999; 
Helliar et al., 2002). To the contrary, the high credit demand and economic boom during this 
period seem to have made the banks ignore, or even dismantle, the existing control 
mechanisms. Not until the banking industry was hit by a second jolt was the expected PMS’s 
change brought to the fore. 
Table 4 Amount of income stemming from net interest income 1980-1989 
 
1980 1983 1986 1989 
Wermlandsbanken  74.54% 76.48% 69.41% 77.49% 
Östgötabanken 75.58% 75.19% 65.45% 72.38% 
Götabanken 69.78% 70.26% 61.31% 74.79% 
Sundsvallsbanken 83.79% 78.60% NA NA 
Skaraborgsbanken  71.40% 75.43% 70.41% 80.54% 
Uplandsbanken 77.14% 78.24% NA NA 
Svenska Handelsbanken  69.57% 72.76% 67.93% 74.45% 
Jämtlands Folkbank 85.85% 81.27% 46.93% 76.44% 
Skånska banken  79.01% 74.99% 69.28% 76.50% 
PKbanken  82.38% 81.69% 69.36% 81.73% 
Bohusbanken 70.67% 72.93% 58.48% 65.45% 
Sparbankernas bank 52.02% 50.00% 61.24% 37.35% 
Föreningsbankernas Bank 82.06% 79.21% 52.87% 40.70% 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken  62.89% 62.18% 57.99% 62.20% 
Nordbanken NA NA 71.02% 76.45% 
Svea Banken NA NA 86.50% 86.66% 
Mean 75.22% 75.00% 66.17% 75.42% 
Median 75.06% 75.31% 68.60% 76.44% 
 
* It should be noted that throughout the 1980s three banks (PKBanken, SEB and SHB) accounted for 
approximately 70 percent of total assets of Swedish commercial banks and if Götabanken and Sparbankernas 
Bank13 is included these five banks accounted for 85 percent of total assets. 
* Sparbankernas Bank and Föreningsbankernas Bank are excluded from the mean since these two banks acted as 
central banks for the savings banks and member banks and therefore had dissimilar portfolios. 
* The decreased net interest income in 1986 can be explained by increased funding costs resulting. Before the 
deregulations, banks were obliged to buy state bonds and the increasing interest rates offered by the Riksbank 
meant that the interest received on the margin between the bond-rate and the lending rate was reduced. 
Source: Statistics Sweden 
                                                 
13
 Sparbankernas Bank was a commercial bank founded by the Swedish savings banks to act as a central bank for 
the savings banks group. 
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The Swedish financial crisis and PMS’s change  
The first part of the 1990s was characterized by one of the worst financial crisis in 
Sweden’s history. In the fall of 1989 the industrial output index and the real estate prices 
started to go down and interest rates started to go up. Consequently credit demand, which had 
remained high during the latter part of the 1980s, suddenly began to decrease.  What initially 
seemed like a financial crisis caused by a downturn on the real estate market quickly spread to 
the whole Swedish economy and the number of bankruptcies quickly increased causing huge 
credit losses for the banks (Larsson & Sjögren, 1995). From 1990 to 1993 Swedish banks 
declared credit losses of more than SEK 180b and in 1992, which was the worst year, the 
credit losses amounted to SEK 70b (see Figure 2 below).  
 
 
The main reasons for Swedish financial crisis at the early 1990s was, according to 
respondents, the lack of proper information systems, lack of routines, and negligence in the 
credit evaluation process. These arguments have also been the most commonly cited in the 
literature (see e.g. Larsson & Sjögen, 1995; Englund, 1999). From a theoretical perspective 
these arguments could be seen as part of the interpretation and integration process (Arroyo, 
2012) justifying the solution of which a major change in the PMSs appears to have been an 
important component.  
The crisis led to a complete restructuring of the field, and several of the established 
commercial banks either went bankrupt, or merged with other banks to survive. The co-
operative banks merged and formed Föreningsbanken, and the large savings banks merged to 
form Sparbanken Sverige (both were introduced at the Stockholm Stock Exchange in the mid-
1990s). During the first months of the crisis the Swedish government was reluctant to act as a 
lender of last resort, but as the crisis intensified more active governance was necessary. The 
state took over the full ownership of Nordbanken and Gota Bank, and several support 
measures were designed to strengthen the financial system. In 1993 the state decided to form 
a bank support agency (Bankstödsnämnden), which came to administrate the support 
mechanisms and the state ownership. The bank support agency together with the Swedish 
government can be seen as strong stakeholders in the negotiation process that resulted in a 
number of new key objectives for the Swedish banks. Three objectives recurred in the data as 
Figure 3 Bank Profits and Credit Losses, 1990-9 (billion SEK, 12-month moving average) 
Source: Englund, 1999:90 
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particularly important for the PMS’s change that followed over the coming years; (i) 
profitability focus, (ii) a more balanced risk-taking, and (iii) diversification and 
internationalization. 
Profitability focus and PMS’s change 
With increasing loan losses, and strong pressures from the state to improve bank 
efficiency, several large cost reduction initiatives were introduced during the early 1990s (e.g. 
SEB, 1990:5-6; Nordbanken, 1990:4-5, Åsling, 2002; Körberg, 2010). For example, the 
forming of Sparbanken Sverige
14
 (Swedbank) was, according to the CEO at that time, partly a 
consequence of the pressing need for rationalization within the Swedish banking system: 
‘…these large savings banks were terribly sub-optimized, if we take Sparbanken Alfa there 
was just building on building on building. Originally Alfa was a merger between five regional 
saving banks and after the merger they had just put them together and added a corporate 
head office, without any rationalization what so ever…’. Consequently a program to reduce the 
labor force with 20 percent from 10,000 employees to 8,000 employees was initiated. The 
program was guided by a new vision to: ‘recreate the savings bank of the 1940s to the 
environment of the 1990s’. The vision meant a drastic decentralization of the organizational 
structure in which the 700 branch offices were organized under 130 local divisions with their 
own board of directors and full decision-making power. Because Swedbank was primarily a 
retail bank, with a historical heritage in the savings banks movement, decentralization was a 
key aspect both in terms of motivating the employees and to control the risk-taking. 
Communication was essential in order to diffuse the new practices to the rest of the 
organization, and 15 teams, each responsible for different aspects of the implementation, were 
set up with people from different parts of the organization. This process was facilitated by the 
CEO’s established network within the savings banks group: ‘My great advantage, during this 
time, was that I knew all the people in the system. Because I had been around and met them 
all I knew who to talk to and who to avoid. Apart from my experience within banking, this 
network was my unique advantage’ (Previous CEO of Swedbank). The respondent further 
explained that an internal broad-casting system was utilized to hold weekly sessions in which 
all employees got information about the current performance of the bank and what steps were 
necessary to proceed with the program (see also Körberg, 2010).  
The long-term financial goals for the bank was set to; a 15 percent return on equity, a 
cost/income ratio of 0.50, a credit losses to loan ratio of less than 0.5 percent, and an equity to 
asset ratio of 6.0 percent (AR, 1993). The divisions were organized as result units and were 
evaluated based on six financial ratios; earnings before and after loan losses per full-time 
position, loan losses as a percentage of lending, results before and after loan losses, 
commission, fees and other income in relation to the cost of personal and the cost/income-
ration before and after loan losses (AR, 1994). These performance measures reflect the focus 
on cost efficiency, profitability, and risk that dominated after the Swedish financial crisis. 
The case of Swedbank is descriptive of the developments on the Swedish banking 
market. The profitability focus and high dependence on financial KPIs to measure 
performance can also be seen as an expression of the uncertain environment in which the 
Swedish banks operated (Hussain & Hoque, 2002; Hussain, 2003; 2005) after the crisis and, 
as will be elaborated on below, a need to restore legitimacy. 
                                                 
14
 The forming of Swedbank was initially a merger between the 11 largest savings banks in Sweden and 
Sparbankernas bank. In 1995 Sparbanken Sverige AB was introduced at the Stockholms Stock Exchange and 
two years later they merged with Föreningsbanken AB to form FöreningsSparbanken AB. In 2006 they changed 
name to Swedbank (see Essay one). 
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Risk procedures and PMS’s change 
Before the crisis, Swedish banks had only experienced limited credit losses but with the 
crisis, a new reality appeared and suddenly the banks had to become painfully aware of the 
risks involved in banking (Carlsson & Nyblom, 2008). All of the respondents discussed the 
effect of the crisis on the risk culture within Swedish banking, which resulted in new control 
mechanism and routines that were developed to support a more organized risk-taking. The 
need to restore legitimacy, both between individual banks and the state, and between the 
banks and the Swedish people, can be seen as an important driving force in the post-crisis 
reconstruction work, perhaps more so in Nordea than in any other bank: ‘We were full of some 
sort of passion to repay every penny, that we got during the crisis, to the Swedish people. This 
passion, to do good for our shareholders, for the Swedish people, it persisted a long time and 
it is still there’ (previous CEO of Nordea). A new top management team was recruited in 
Nordea, and one of their key tasks was to reinvent prudent risk-taking and create a strong risk-
culture within the bank. Two major initiatives were taken at an early stage and these are 
described by respondents in the following manners: ‘We started by centralizing all the major 
credit decisions to get a grip on, both the bad credits, and the bad creditors. The bad credits 
were placed in Securum
15
 and the bad creditors had to do something else in life’ (Previous 
chairman of Nordea). Shortly after being appointed we created a training program in which 
more than 1,000 employees were trained in the basics of giving credits’ (Previous CEO of 
Nordea). The quotes clearly demonstrate the interpretation and integration process that went 
on, among the top management team, and how it resulted in the formulation of a new training 
program that was diffused among the organizational members for them to encode, enact and 
reproduce. 
The changed perception of risk within the large Swedish banks did not only affect their 
organizational cultures, but also their organizational structures. Several of the respondents 
discussed the importance of giving the credit organizations a more prominent role and the 
large banks started separating between the risk and reward evaluations in their business 
decisions. Credit committees were formed to decide on the bank’s overall risk-appetite and, 
unlike the reward-decisions, credit-decisions could never be taken by one person. During and 
after the crisis there is also a much greater focus on risk in the annual reports of the large 
banks. As noted above these were initially focusing on credit losses, but from the mid-1990s 
various risk-adjusted performance measures and value-at-risk discussions start appearing in 
the annual reports (SEB; 1994; SHB, 1996; Nordea, 1999; Swedbank, 2002). With new PMSs 
supporting profitability focus and prudent risk-taking, the Swedish banks were set to take the 
next step, and in the aftermath of the crisis, Swedish banks followed the global trend in 
banking of diversification, mergers and acquisitions, and internationalization (e.g. Larson et 
al., 2011). 
Diversification, internationalization, and PMS’s change 
A combination of factors provided for the next step in the theorization process, which 
seem to have relied heavily on the arguments of economies of scale and scope. The former 
chairman of the board in Nordea infers the expansion, which started in the mid-1990s and 
continued until 2007/08, to three factors: (i) the risk of being acquired by one of the large 
international players on the banking arena, (ii) the opportunity to expand into eastern Europe 
with the fall of the Soviet Union, and (iii) the need for sheer size to absorb the growing 
expenditures on IT-systems and customers demand for larger and larger credits (Palmstierna, 
2008:165-166). Initially the mergers were restricted to the national level but it quickly spread 
                                                 
15
 Several of the large commercial banks in Sweden created so called ‘bad banks’ to which they transferred their 
bad credits. The bad bank of Nordea was named Securum, and about one third of Nordea’s total business lending 
(SEK 67b) was transferred to Securum in 1992 (see Bergström et al., 2002 for a detailed description). 
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to become pan-Nordic (Lindblom & von Koch, 2002), and in the 2000s Swedish banks also 
started to expand outside the Nordic countries, primarily into the Baltic region. However, the 
expansion did not only occur through M&A’s, but also by a desire among the Swedish banks 
to become universal banks. The deregulations had allowed banks to enter into other areas of 
the financial sector (e.g. insurance business) and after the crisis, the large commercial banks 
gradually started moving away from the dependence on interest taking for income generation 
(see Table 4). 
Table 5 Amount of income stemming from net interest income 1990-1999 
 
1990 1993 1996 1999 
Östgötabanken 78.31% 73.84% NA NA 
Gota Bank 81.30% 67.40% NA NA 
Norra Nordbanken 82.93% NA NA NA 
Svenska Handelsbanken  76.68% 69.34% 58.96% 67.47% 
JP Bank 32.30% 92.56% NA NA 
Skånska Banken 82.97% NA NA NA 
Nordbanken 82.66% 69.25% 66.35% 59.44% 
Bohusbanken 70.01% 53.47% NA NA 
Sparbankernas Bank 37.82% 62.76% 63.81% 58.97% 
Föreningsbankernas Bank 39.10% 75.95% 68.96% NA 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken  64.87% 54.50% 40.93% 34.99% 
Svea Banken 93.29% NA NA NA 
Mean 74.53% 68.78% 59.80% 55.22% 
Median 79.80% 69.25% 63.81% 59.20% 
 
Source: Statistics Sweden 
The diversification and the M&A driven internationalization during the latter part of the 
1990s led to a divisionalization of the organizational structures in the large Swedish banks. 
Since the divisions were commonly (and still are) results units, more complex cost systems, 
transfer pricing mechanism, and capital allocation techniques had to be implemented (see 
Hussain, 2005). These systems enabled banks to start charging customers individually, based 
on the cost of a specific product or service. Accentuated by the technological development, 
transaction-based lending (i.e. lending based on financial statement lending, asset-based 
lending, or credit scoring) started evolving and several of the respondents discussed the 
growing importance of sales-orientation during this period. According to the HR-manager of 
SEB the demands on bank employees have increased drastically in relation to the 
rationalization programs, increasing competition, the tougher climate on the banking market, 
and more diversified product portfolios: ‘there has been a consistent movement towards 
giving the employees clearer targets, and the demands on each individual to perform has also 
increased’.  
In less than a decade the Swedish banks went from complete crisis, to being among the 
most efficient and high-performing banks in Europe (Polster, 2004). The political reforms 
during the 1990s seemed to have paid off, and by the early 2000s an international literature 
discussing “The Great Moderation” was evolving. It was argued that the new politics of 
deregulations, floating exchange rates, international integration, strict inflation targets, and 
reduced dependence on the state had provided for a more stable economic environment (e.g. 
Benati & Surico, 2009). However, the internationalization of the financial markets, the 
economic integration of the EU countries, and an increasing number of corporate scandals 
(both in the EU and in the US), created a need for more international regulations of banks. 
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This development was amplified by the financial crisis that hit the world in 2007/2008, and 
since then, a growing regulatory regime has practically flooded the banks in new 
administrative routines, with probable consequence for the PMSs of the large Swedish banks 
(e.g. Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998; Euske & Riccaboni, 1999; Helliar et al., 2002). 
A new regulatory regime, the world-wide financial crisis and PMS’s change 
The deregulations in the mid-1980s resulted in a new regulatory framework and in 1987 
a new Banking Act (SFS 1987:617) came into force (Larsson, 1998). The new legislation had 
a broader scope and was more functionally oriented, which made it more coherent with the 
EC regulations (Kazarian, 1994). In 1992 Sweden signed the EEA agreement meaning that 
Sweden was espoused to comply with the EC rules on financial services. An important feature 
of the European legal framework was that it encompassed the international standards of the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Ems et al., 1993). Basel I had two purposes (i) to 
strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system and (ii) to reduce 
competitive inequalities by creating an international regulatory standard. Put simply Basel I 
required banks to hold a minimum capital standard of 8 percent
16
. The basic nature of Basel I 
made it subject to extensive critique and a series of meetings and reports in 1998 led to the 
launch of the Financial Service Action Plan (FSAP) in 1999. The idea of the FSAP was to 
remove market and regulatory barriers within EU’s financial service sector in order to create a 
level playing field among the market participants (see Haan et al., 2009:50-55 for a discussion 
of the content of FSAP). The FSAP included the first draft of the Basel II framework and can 
be seen as the starting point for the explosion of new regulatory requirements (see Table 5 
below) directed at the banking industry. 
Table 6. Regulatory initiative during the 2000s 
Regulation Content Introduced Effective by 
Basel II 
Pillar 1 minimum capital requirements, Pillar 2 
supervisory review, Pillar 3 market discipline 
through disclosure 
2004 2007 
Basel III 
Increased minimum capital requirements, a gross 
debt-equity ratio, liquidity measures, and stricter 
liquidity reporting 
2009 
Implementation 
starting in 2013 and 
finished by 2019 
FFFS 2004:4; 
MiFID 
Regulations and guidelines regarding competence 
requirements and documentation procedures for 
firms providing financial advice to consumers 
2004 
2004 and adapted to 
MiFID in 2007 
FACTA 
The US tax authorities place requirements on 
foreign banks to report if they have US customers 
and to treat these customers according to FATCA. 
2010 2013 
 
Other regulatory initiatives include the Packaged Retail Investment Products (PRIPs), the 
Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFMD), the EU regulations on OTC 
derivatives (EMIR) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. In 
addition, there has been a vast development within the financial accounting framework for 
banks and in 2005 it became mandatory for Swedish listed companies to adhere to the IFRS 
issued by the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB). 
The main objective of banking regulators is prudential i.e. to reduce the risk level for 
bank creditors (e.g. depositors) and to mitigate systemic financial risks (Barth & Landsman, 
2010:401-2). Still, the consequences of implementing such comprehensive and complicated 
                                                 
16 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm accessed 2011-11-04 
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regulations are multidimensional. For example, Olsson (2009) shows that some of the 
smallest savings banks on the Swedish market have been forced to merge in order to survive 
the financial burden of adapting to the new regulations. In addition, Whalström (2009) 
predicts that the new regulations will have a centralizing effect on the banks, as the 
complexity of the new regulations increase the influence of specialists located at the banks’ 
headquarters. In fact, signs of centralizations are already visible, among the large commercial 
banks in Sweden, and both Nordea and SEB have introduced strategic initiatives that foster 
centralization (i.e. the ‘One Bank’ concept in Nordea, and the ‘One SEB’ concept in SEB). 
Thus, the regulatory regime forced top managers of Swedish banks have to interpret and 
integrate an increasing number of regulations. This process was made even more complicated 
by the advent of the financial crisis and the numerous additional regulations which have been 
suggested in the aftermath of the crisis. Still, as will be elaborated on below some of the 
investigated banks had already started this transition prior to the reregulation and the crisis. 
The internationalization, which was initiated in the late 1990s continued well into the 
2000s and from 2000 to 2008 the total balance sheet size of the four largest banks grew from 
approximately SEK 5200b to almost SEK 11,000b. Throughout this period the shareholder 
oriented view came to dominate much of the banking scene (e.g. Schuster, 1999; Dalborg, 
1999
17
) underpinned by what appears to be a belief that sheer size was a key component of 
efficiency, or at least survival (Larson et al., 2011:58). As mentioned earlier, the rapid growth 
led to a divisionalization within the Swedish banks, but with the centralizing pressure of the 
regulations, and the obvious conclusion of the crisis that size alone was not sufficient for 
survival, the large Swedish banks have started to emphasize organic growth, relationship 
lending, and customer orientation. The rationale behind this gradual shift seems to reside in a 
negotiation process that builds primarily on three factors; reregulation and the need for 
unification, the consistent success of Svenska Handelsbanken, and the turbulence on the 
financial markets. 
Reregulation and the need for unification 
During the growth period Swedish banks had become fragmented, which gave rise to 
sub-optimization problems and the large number of M&A’s provided for the need to unite the 
banks around a set of common values. This was expressed by the HR-manager of SEB in the 
following way: ‘The bank expanded a lot in the late 1990’s and into the 2000’s, in Germany, 
in the Baltic States, and throughout Eastern Europe. We bought TryggHansa
18
 in 1997, so the 
bank was very much in a growth mode for a number of years. When our new CEO
19
 came in, 
we started to shrink our portfolio, started to focus, we were not the only bank that did this, but 
we created ‘One SEB’. During the growth period the bank had been organized in a holding 
structure, and each division acted in their own interest. We turned this, which means that we 
have been forced to centralize and coordinate our activities at the bank level’. The quote 
indicates that centralization was perceived as a matter of necessity motivated by the need for a 
more holistic view of the bank’s operations. For SEB20, this process started already in the 
early 2000s after the planned merger between SEB and Swedbank was cancelled by the EU-
commission for competitive reasons. After the failed merger SEB introduced a strategic 
initiative named the three Cs; customer satisfaction, cooperation, and cost-conscious. Thus, 
not only did the new regulation pressure SEB to become more centralized, by forcing the 
bank to transfer resources to the head office, but there was also an internal rationale 
                                                 
17
 A pamphlet on shareholder value in banking written by Hans Dalborg, which at that time was the CEO of 
Nordea. 
18
 A Swedish insurance company. 
19
 Referring to the Annika Falkengren, who started as CEO in November 2005. 
20
 Nordea also started a similar program to unite the bank in the early 2000. 
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encouraging coordination at the top management level. Perhaps not surprisingly, these 
pressures have made SEB gradually change their PMSs practices for example by: integrating 
ideas about cross-selling and cooperation into the training programs; measuring and 
rewarding employees based on their ability to cooperate (e.g. ‘being a good corporate 
soldier’); and by altering the budget process from a bottom-up process to more of a top-down 
analysis in which the budget targets are set at the group level. 
The Handelsbanken model 
After an organizational crisis in the late 1960s, Jan Wallander, a former economist and at 
that time the managing director of a medium-sized regional bank (Sundsvallsbanken), was 
recruited to conduct a reshaping of Svenska Handelsbanken (SHB)
21
. Wallander decided to 
radically decentralize the bank (although some tasks, such as the bank-to-bank lending, were 
in fact centralized), by allocating responsibility and credit authority to branch offices. The 
organizational culture was shifted towards empowerment and cooperation, the manpower at 
the head-office was cut by a third, and budgets were abandoned in favor of information 
systems on a need-to-know basis. Wallander describes it as a time-consuming and sometimes 
tedious endeavor which took more than a decade to complete, and during much of the 1970s 
and 80s, SHB was critiqued for its ‘dogmatic’ management approach. However, with the 
Swedish financial crisis, the critique quickly faded. As it turned out, SHB managed the crisis 
far better than the other banks and was the only major bank to go through the crisis without 
need for government support
22
. Similar to the other banks, SHB has grown significantly both 
organically and through M&As’ and the expansion and diversification on the Swedish market 
in the mid-1990s was followed by entrance into the other Nordic countries and the UK. Two 
main objectives have guided the SHB approach ever since the re-shaping of the bank in 
1970s; (i) to be the most profitable bank in every home market they act on, and (ii) to achieve 
higher than average customer satisfaction in the banking sector. To accomplish these goals 
SHB has been organized in a flat structure with only three hierarchical levels (CEO, regional 
manager, and branch manager). At the branch-level, benchmarking is used extensively and the 
branches are compared in terms of cost/income ratio and customer satisfaction. These simple 
but effective control mechanisms together with the consistent reinforcement of the core values 
(empowerment, responsibility, and cooperation), through internal communication, training 
and development, and the recruitment policy, has remained relatively unchanged over the past 
decades, and according to the SHB’s own communication, the bank has reached their main 
goals almost without exceptions the last 40 years (e.g. Wallander, 1999; Cäker, 2012
23
). 
Although some of the respondents mentioned that they glanced at SHB after the Swedish 
financial crisis, the influence of the SHB model appears to have grown stronger under the 
2000s. Today the four large banks all have a strategic focus on customer satisfaction, 
relationship lending, and organic growth. This is to be achieved through decentralized 
organizational structures, greater reliance on non-financial performance measures and 
extensive usage of relative performance evaluations, strong and prudent risk management, and 
more collaborative organizational cultures. Although none of the other three banks have 
abandoned the budget they have adapted a more flexible approach towards it in which the 
budget targets are evaluated in relation to external and internal conditions. Relative performance 
evaluations are used by several banks (e.g. through comparing the results of similar branches to 
each other or to evaluate the performance trend rather than the absolute number) to overcome the 
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 The case of SHB has been very well documented, not least through the many publications by the former CEO 
and Chairman, Dr. Jan Wallander (see e.g. Wallander, 1995; 1999; 2003). 
22 Although SEB had discussions with the Bank Support Agency, they never actually resulted in any direct 
support but instead new equity capital was invested in the bank by the private owners to ensure that capital 
requirements were fulfilled (Englund, 1999) 
23
 Unpublished working paper. 
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problem of external influences. This is expressed by the Head of Merchant Banking in SEB in the 
following way: ‘You know, when evaluating performance it is difficult to know whether 15 
percent return on equity is good or not but if we move from 15 to 17 percent than we are probably 
doing something right’. 
The turbulence on the financial markets 
Already in 2007 signs of the financial crisis had been visible but when Lehman Brothers 
filed for bankruptcy in September 2008 it became the trigger of the world-wide financial 
crisis (Caprio & Honohan, 2010). Swedish banks exited the crisis in a relatively good condition, 
compared to many of their international peers, but the Swedish government still had to take action 
and in February 2009 the government decided to allocate SEK 50b for bank recapitalization 
(Goddard, et al., 2009). In addition, three Swedish banks have lost their bank charters and 
Swedbank, SEB, and Nordea, all issued new equity to absorb the anticipated credit losses. 
Swedbank was hit badly by the crisis; primarily because of large exposures to the Baltic market, 
and because a large part of their credits were funded by short-term market lending, but the bank 
also had a complex outstanding tri-party loan repo agreement to Lehman Brother of 
approximately SEK 9.2b, which resulted in a massive collapse of the bank’s share value. In 
response to the crisis the top management team in Swedbank was replaced and at the General 
Meeting in 2009 the new CEO presented a new strategic direction; ‘back to the roots’. Although it 
might be questionable, as the ‘new’ direction is very similar to the reshaping that took place in the 
1990s, it would seem as if Swedbank is now also moving closer to the SHB model for example by 
creating strong regional offices and transferring the credit authority closer to the customers. 
DISCUSSION 
As outlined in the previous section, the large Swedish banks have adapted their PMSs to 
the external pressures in different ways depending on the type of pressure. The findings 
reflect how deregulations, financial crisis, technological development, internationalization and 
similar events are interpreted by top management top become integrated into the PMSs and 
diffused throughout the banks. As illustrated above, the large Swedish banks have developed 
in a strikingly uniform way and certainly the isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983) of regulators, successful competitors, and the norms of the field, are part of the 
explanation. Still, reducing the banks to passive players in a path-dependent search for 
legitimacy does not seem to tell the full story. Discussing the study further I seek to explain 
how different type of jolts were interpreted and integrated into the PMSs in different ways 
depending on the nature of the jolt. 
How are external pressures interpreted and integrated into the PMSs? 
A common factor to explain institutional change is precipitating jolts at the field level i.e. 
social upheavals, technological disruptions, competitive discontinuities, or regulatory change 
(Greenwood et al., 2002). The Arroyo (2012) model suggests that the individual process of 
interpreting a jolt also plays an important role in the integration of PMS’s change. As 
illustrated above the Swedish banking industry has experienced a series of such jolts with 
varying effects on the PMSs of the four largest Swedish banks. Interestingly, neither the 
deregulations nor the re-regulations seem to have had any substantial effects on the PMSs in 
the investigated banks. 
The interpretation and integration of regulatory change 
Previous studies have found regulatory change to be an important factor to explain 
PMS’s change in banks (e.g. Euske & Riccaboni, 1999; Helliar et al., 2002; van der Steen, 
2011). Still, the present study shows that the way in which the deregulations were interpreted 
at the top management level in the banks did not result in any major change to the PMSs. In 
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the aftermath, both researchers and practitioners have ascribed the absence of PMS’s 
innovation to the swiftness of the deregulations and the inexperience of banking staff to the 
new market conditions (Petersson, 1993; Larsson & Sjöberg, 1998; Urwitz, 1998; Englund, 
1999). Yet, as shown by the case of Gota Bank it was not only a matter of not having the 
proper systems or experience but also a consequence of a failure among top management to 
reinforce and improve current practices in order for organizational members to persistently 
enact and reproduce them. Moving back to Figure 1 this suggests that rather than a field-level 
jolt always being followed by innovation in the PMSs, the jolt may also be followed by 
deinstitutionalization of the existing PMSs to be replaced by practices that ignore the existing 
rules and routines. The fact that the employees of Gota Bank did not understand how bad their 
situation was and the comments made in hindsight by Gabriel Urwitz, indicate that such “bad” 
practices can even become integrated into the cognitive maps of both managers and 
employees through the process of institutionalization. 
However, as noted by Arroyo (2012) the absence of PMS’s change does not necessarily 
mean that the organizational members will not have to interpret and integrate the precipitating 
jolt. The change of management in Gota Bank indicates the power-struggles that went on 
during the deinstitutionalization of the PMSs and the hostility of the interpretation and 
integration processes in which only those who shared the same beliefs of the strongest actors 
were allowed to stay. According to Lawrence et al (2005) only a limited number of new ideas 
will be accepted on the group or organizational level, and in the interpretation phase, this is 
best facilitated though influence based on access to scarce resources, relevant expertise, an/or 
culturally appropriate social skills. This might explain why the top management was not 
replaced directly after Gota Bank was acquired. However, in the integration phase, force, 
based on formal authority, is the most prominent strategy (ibid) explaining why the top 
management did eventually got replaced. Crossan (1999) further ascribes personal experience 
an important role during the interpretation and integration phase. On a more general level the 
experience among Swedish bankers was that extending credits to the real estate sector was not 
associated with any major risks (i.e. they did not know how to price risk under the new market 
conditions), thus, offering valid arguments for the vast expansion within this segment. As the 
new practices diffused among the banks, each organizational member went through their own 
process of interpretation and in some cases they did not agree (e.g. when the worried members 
of Gota Bank approach the consultant) but through disciplinary measures such as 
socialization, compensation, and training (Lawrence et al., 2005) they were formed to follow 
the same expansive strategies that were propagated by the top managers. 
Moving on to the re-regulation, the field-level theorization process is still ongoing but so 
far it has primarily revolved around two key issues; the need for internationally viable bank 
regulations (Haan et al., 2009) and corporate scandals and crisis (Barth & Landsman, 2010; 
Mikes, 2011). The pressure on the Swedish banks from regulatory stakeholders such as the 
FSA, the Ministry of Finance, and the Riksbank has been growing and was further amplified 
by the financial crisis. However, the findings of this study show that not even regulations 
emphasizing market discipline through disclosure (such as the third Pillar of Basel II) have 
had any major direct effects on the PMSs of the investigated banks. Wahlström (2009) discuss 
centralization as a probable consequence of a larger regulatory burden but centralization had 
already started in at least two of the large Swedish banks (Nordea and SEB) prior to the 
introduction of Basel II. Furthermore, none of the investigated banks discussed regulation as 
the main driver of centralization but instead centralization was described as a necessary 
consequence of growth and divisionalization. Similarly, the increasing focus on risk 
management and risk-related performance measures, in the large Swedish banks, did also start 
long before the Basel II framework came into effect. 
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The interpretation and integration of crises 
The Swedish financial crisis abruptly ended the credit expansion and created a large 
pressure on the banks to change their practices. The banks’ trust index plummeted and the 
need to restore legitimacy for the financial system was vital, not only for the banks but also 
for the Swedish state. Thus, in the field-level theorization process the state became a strong 
stakeholder, not least because it had been forced to ensure the survival of practically all the 
banks. To restore legitimacy the banks independently specified their problems and came up 
with a number of ‘innovations’, consistent with the demands of the state, to bring order to the 
chaotic situation. The structure of the field also changed drastically during this period, 
initially through a reduction of the number of banks, but as the conditions stabilized new 
players started diversifying from other core businesses (e.g. insurance and food) into banking. 
The deregulations made it possible for these new players to enter the field and the crisis 
offered an opportunity for new banks to attract customers on behalf of the distressed banks. 
These new players put further pressure on the existing banks to rationalize their operations 
and become more cost efficient. 
The findings show that unlike the deregulations, the Swedish crisis had two rather direct 
effects on the PMSs of the large banks; expressed through profitability focus and prudent risk 
management. In Swedbank the need for rationalization was an important part of the 
interpretation process and in the power struggles that resulted from the merger
24
, the relevant 
expertise and social skills of the top management were important resources in mobilizing the 
change. To integrate a rationalization program that meant a reduction of the labor force with 
20 percent, under normal conditions, would probably have required extensive use of force 
(Lawrence et al., 2005). The crisis facilitated this process and through the persistent 
communication of the need for drastic measures the employees were trained to perceive 
change as a prerequisite for survival. In fact, the change process in Swedbank follow closely 
the three steps of implementing change as identified by the management literature on change 
(see Battilana et al (2010) for a review) i.e. developing a vision, mobilizing people behind that 
vision, and motivating them to achieve and sustain the vision suggesting that future studies on 
PMS’s change may gain from an interaction with this field. 
On the field level, the fierce competitions that started after the deregulations resulted in 
reduced profit margins for the banks. As long as the banks could compensate decreasing 
margins with larger volumes they remained profitable, but with the crisis, increasing the 
volume were no longer an alternative and instead the banks started programs to reduce their 
costs. As the pressure from the crisis faded, new rules and routines were necessary to 
institutionalize the cost consciousness. The banks implemented activity based costing and 
similar techniques, propagated shareholder value, and emphasized financial performance 
measures to make organizational members continuously encode, enact, and reproduce the idea 
of profitability through cost control. Similarly, prudent risk management was institutionalized 
through the altering of organizational structures, developing training programs, and shifting 
the internal power structures by strengthening the role of the risk function. In Nordea the poor 
state of the risk management, prior to the crisis, even forced the top management to conduct 
one masse training sessions on the basics of giving credits. 
The effects of the recent crisis on the PMSs of the large Swedish banks are more 
ambiguous. Although the field-level theorization process seems to have ended the 
international expansion and the M&A-driven growth, among the investigated banks, major 
PMS’s change are largely absent. Swedbank has decided go back to the roots, and thereby 
approaching the SHB model, much like SEB and Nordea started doing in the early 2000s. 
Maybe the organizational memory of the Swedish financial crisis, as mentioned in the 
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interviews, mitigated the negative effects of the crisis and provided arguments to maintain the 
existing PMSs. Further research on the effect of the financial crisis on the PMSs of banks is 
needed and particularly comparative studies between countries that have not had a relatively 
recent financial crisis, prior to the current crisis, and those that have. 
Institutional entrepreneurs and the process of PMS’s change 
Based on the idea of the institutional entrepreneur as an actor who leverages resources to 
create new, or transform existing institutions (Battilana et al., 2009:68) it is quite difficult to 
discern any particular individual or organization that were acting as the initiator of the “mal” 
practices that diffused among Swedish banks after the deregulations. The same holds for the 
majority of change processes discussed here, and accordingly the present work gives support 
to the growing number of studies that view institutional entrepreneurship as a collective 
phenomenon (e.g. Dorado, 2005; Lausbury & Crumley, 2007; Delbridge & Edwards, 2008). 
Perhaps the only institutional entrepreneur, acting individually, throughout the modern history 
of the Swedish banking industry is SHB or even Jan Wallander. If so, the practices have taken 
more than 30 years to diffuse and are still partly resisted (e.g. the other large banks still use 
budgets) despite the successful performance of SHB. This observation raises at least two 
important issues; (i) the time-frame adopted when studying institutional change in relation to 
PMS’s change and (ii) does PMS’s change depend on the field-level conditions?  
In general, organizational scholars studying institutional change tend to adopt a time-
frame of 10-20 years (see e.g. Greenwood et al., 2002; Sherer & Lee, 2002; Munir, 2005) 
whereas studies of management accounting change have adopted a somewhat shorter time-
frame (for example Cobb et al (1995) use five years, Helliar et al (2002) study a period of 
seven years, Soin et al (2002) use two years, and van der Steen (2011) use five years). The 
results of this study indicate that a time-frame closer to the former may be auspicious when 
investigating the relationship between institutional and PMS’s change but a more 
comprehensive debate concerning time-frame is encouraged. 
The high degree of institutionalization (e.g. Deephouse, 1996) and the homogeneity of 
the Swedish banking industry (e.g. with the same four large commercial banks continuously 
dominating the field) may impede institutional change (Battilana et al 2009). However, as 
noted by Dorado (2005:400) different type of fields may need different profiles to initiate 
institutional change. She claims that opportunity opaque fields (i.e. more institutionally 
developed fields) may need institutional partaking: ‘the act of countless agents converging 
over time’. This would explain why it is difficult to identify a single organization or 
individual as a main actor in the change processes discussed in the present study. More 
importantly, it gives advice to future studies when applying an institutional entrepreneurship 
approach to PMS’s change, suggesting that such studies should account for the field-level 
conditions as a factor to identify actors involved in the change process. 
CONCLUSION 
The present study shows how external pressures such as regulatory change and financial 
crises are interpreted and integrated into the PMSs of large commercial banks in Sweden. A 
model to investigate PMS’s change from a multilevel perspective (Arroyo, 2012) is used to 
illustrate the dynamics of the multiple processes of change initiated by a precipitating jolt. 
The institutional entrepreneurship approach stems from the study of organizations, but as 
suggested by Arroyo (2012), the findings of this study indicate that accounting scholars 
interested in PMS’s change have much to gain from utilizing this approach. Not only does the 
IE framework bridge two commonly used frameworks to explain how and why PMSs change 
(i.e. NIS and OIE) but it could also be utilized to answer the questions of what and who 
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initiates PMS’s change. However, as noted above the latter requires an understanding of the 
field-level conditions of which the organization/organizations under study are subjected to. 
The need for multilevel studies of change is driven by the economic integration and 
globalization (Tracy, 2011; Arroyo, 2012), and the present study shows how the external 
pressures on organizations are becoming increasingly global, both in terms of crises and 
regulations. The consequences of such globalized external pressures are only just starting to 
materialize but they are sure to engage researchers for many years to come. Still, whether the 
pressures are global or local, external or internal, they will always be interpreted by 
individuals from the perspective of their own experience, and as shown here such pressures 
may or may not become integrated into the PMSs. 
An adjacent and important question is raised by the finding that the large commercial 
banks in Sweden only to a limited extent have adapted their PMSs in response to regulatory 
change. Is regulatory change only an artificial way to transfer responsibility and 
accountability from banks to regulators, without any real effects on banks practices? 
McKinzey (2012) estimates that return on equity for European retail banks will fall from on 
average 10 percent to 6 percent as a result of the new regulations. These are costs that will 
ultimately be borne by bank customers i.e. each and every one of us. Clearly the arguments 
that preceded the deregulations, only a few decades ago, has lost its force and powerful 
stakeholders such as the European Central Bank, the European Banking Authority, and the 
Bank for International Settlements have much to gain from stricter and more complex bank 
regulations. Much more work is needed on the effect of regulatory change on the PMSs of 
banks, both to establish whether the findings of this study are generalizable to other contexts 
and to contribute with insights on how to reform existing regulations. 
Finally, the case of the Swedish banking industry shows the usefulness of adopting a broad 
approach to management accounting and control issues when studying banks. Soin & Schyett 
(2009) argues that management accounting may have passed its glory days in the financial 
services industry, but the present work indicates the opposite. Over the years, banks have adopted 
numerous management accounting techniques including ABC, ABCM, the BSC, sophisticated 
performance measurement systems, complex remuneration packages, and various transfer pricing 
and capital allocation mechanisms (Kimball, 1997) and this study shows that several of these tools 
are still in use, at least in the large Swedish banks. Despite such tools, banks have been strongly 
criticized for having poor management control practices and examples of bad management, 
ranging from extensive risk-seeking activities to fraudulent behavior, are common (see e.g. Wall 
Street and The financial Crises: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse) and the recent $2 billion 
trading loss by JPMorgan Chase & Co. are just one of the many examples of management control 
failures. Thus, it is both timely and important to increase our understanding of how these systems 
can be evaluated and improved. However, to reach a deeper understanding of these issues require 
a broad perspective. Modern banks are service organizations with a high dependence on sales, 
profitability, and risk management and the relation between these issues needs to be studied from 
an accounting perspective (see Merton 1995; Kaplan, 2011), but studying either one separate from 
the other is problematic since they are intrinsically linked and mutually dependent. 
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